Omnibalancing in Syria: prospects for foreign policy by Bergen, Christopher
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2000
Omnibalancing in Syria: prospects for foreign policy
Bergen, Christopher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9173
I 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 









Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
20010215 069 
----~------------------------------------------------------------------------------
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-
0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) I 2. REPORT DATE I 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
December 2000 Master's Thesis 
~·TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Omnibalancing in Syria: Prospects for Foreign Policy 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S) Bergen, Christopher 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) ~·PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
Naval Postgraduate School ~PORT NUMBER 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
9. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING I MONITORING 
NIA AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION I AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is 
unlimited 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum ZOO words) 
Syrian foreign policy has been routinely misunderstood as the domain of one man - Hafiz al-Asad, and 
now his son Bashar al-Asad- who makes decisions irrespective of domestic political considerations in Syria. This 
thesis challenges that conceptualization by arguing that domestic concerns are the central element in the making of 
Syrian foreign policy. I argue Syrian foreign policy is best understood as the result of "omnibalancing" the 
interests and threats of the two key groups of the authoritarian bargain: the 'Alawi military elite, and the Sunni 
urban business class. 
The 'Alawi military elite form the backbone of the Syrian regime. Members of this minority make up 
only 12 percent of the Syrian population, but hold important leadership positions throughout the state. 
The Sunni business class rose to prominence in the Syrian regime because it has the ability to reduce the 
regime's expensive overextension. This group has become junior partners to the 'Alawi military elite. 
The key to the analysis of Syrian foreign policy is the regime leadership's ability to balance its' external 
and internal threats. Conceptualizing Syrian foreign policy through the lens of omnibalancing sheds light on 
Syria's calculations over a possible peace deal with Israel in the years ahead. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Syria, Israel, United States, Lebanon, foreign policy. 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 102 
16. PRICE CODE 
17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION 
CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT 
REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT 
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
----------------------------------------
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
OMNIBALANCING IN SYRIA: PROSPECTS FOR FOREIGN POLICY 
Christopher Bergen 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., Virginia Military Institute 1992 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 
Author: 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2000 
Approved by: 
Fte:de1ick Rocker, Chairman, 
Department ofNational Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
IV 
ABSTRACT 
Syrian foreign policy has been routinely misunderstood as the domain of one man 
- Hafiz a~ Asad, and now his son Bashar a~ Asad - who makes decisions irrespective of 
domestic political considerations in Syria. This thesis challenges that conceptualization 
by arguing that domestic concerns are the central element in the making of Syrian foreign 
policy. I argue Syrian foreign policy is best understood as the result of ''omnibalancing" 
the interests and threats of the two key groups of the authoritarian bargain: the 'Alawi 
military elite, and the Sunni urban business class. 
The 'Alawi military elite form the backbone of the Syrian regime. Members of 
this minority make up only 12 Jl!rcent of the Syrian population, but hold important 
leadership positions throughout the state. 
The Sunni business class rose to prominence in the Syrian regime because it has 
the ability to reduce the regime's expensive overextension. This group has become junior 
partners to the 'Alawi military elite. 
The key to the analysis of Syrian foreign policy is the regime leadership's ability 
to balance its' external and internal threats. Conceptualizing Syrian foreign policy 
through the lens of omnibalancing sheds light on Syria's calculations over a possible 
peace deal with Israel in the years ahead. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 1999, the United States deemed that developments m the Middle East 
"profoundly affect America's future.''* A defining interest for the United States is the 
resolution of conflict between Israel and its neighbors and a normalization of relations 
between Israel and the Arab states. 
Syria and Lebanon remain the last Arab frontline states yet to sign a peace 
agreement with Israel. Arguably, a peace agreement with Israel will be the most 
important foreign policy issue facing these nations in the coming years. The close 
relationship that exists between Syria and Lebanon is the result of geography and 
common history. More recently, however, the two nations signed the Treaty of 
Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination in May 1991, which gives Syria a central 
role in Lebanese security and foreign policy. Lebanese foreign policy would follow 
major Syrian initiatives due to this treaty and the strong Syrian presence in Lebanon. By 
comprehending tre influences of Syrian foreign policy, one can better understand the 
circumstances that would drive Syria and Lebanon to seek peace, war or maintain the 
status quo. This understanding should be a central element in U.S. foreign policy 
towards the region. 
Syrian foreign policy under the As ad family regime is based on the interests of the 
'Alawi military elite and the Sunni urban business elite who compose the authoritarian 
bargain in Syria. Rather than acting on the behalf of popular public attitudes, strategic 
* William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1999), 41. 
ix 
interests of the nation, or the whim of its president, Syrian foreign policy is the result of 
omnibalancing the interests of these two narrowly defined classes. 
The 'Alawi military elite is closely aligned to the regime leadership not only 
ethnically, but through tribal alliances, marriage, and personal ties. The business class 
rose to prominence in the Syrian regime because it had the ability to reduce the state's 
role in the economy and lessen the burden of financial responsibility on an overextended 
state apparatus. With privileged connections, this business elite has moved to the 
forefront of the Syrian economy and has become a junior partner to the 'Alawi military. 
Internal stability is the first requirement for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad 
to sign a peace agreement with Israel. In power for less then a year, the son of Syria's 
longest ruling leader must prove that he is capable of providing the support to the 
members of the authoritarian bargain before he will be able to enter into final 
negotiations. In the interim, if the current regime can also improve Syria economically, 
the new president will gamer increased support from the Syrian people as well as the 
Sunni urban business class. If Asad can maintain the military's status quo, and yet 
improve the economic power of the Sunni urban business Class, he will be more likely to 
and more flexible in, peace negotiations with Israel. At the same time however, Asad 
cannot sign any agreement that would constrain the power or prestige of the 'Alawi 
military elite. His current position in office is due directly to the support of this group. 




The author would like to tmnk, first and foremost, Prof. Robinson and Prof. 
Ghoreishi for their guidance and patience in this endeavor. Additional thanks go to the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II, Middle Eastern relations have been at the 
forefront of the United States foreign policy. Three key issues have predicated U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East during the last half-century. They are: 
• The Cold War confrontation against the former Soviet Union, 
• The security and availability of petroleum resources from the worlds largest 
producers, and 
• The state of Israel and its ability to survive against an array of Arab opponents.I 
As a new century begins, the importance of Israel's security has not diminished. 
In 1999, the United States deemed that developments in the Middle East "profoundly 
affect America's future.''2 The third key issue for the United States is the resolution of 
conflict between Israel and its neighbors and a normalization of relations between Israel 
and the Arab states. 
Syria and Lebanon remain the last Arab frontline states yet to sign a peace 
agreement with Israel. Arguably, a peace agreement with Israel will be the most 
important foreign policy issue facing these nations in the coming years. The close 
relationship that exists between Syria and Lebanon is the result of geography and 
common history. Most recently, however, the two nations signed the Treaty of 
I George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East. (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1990), 7. 
2 William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1999), 41. 
1 
Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination in May 1991 (Appendix A) that gives Syria 
a central role in Lebanese security and foreign policy. Lebanese foreign policy would 
follow major Syrian initiatives due to this treaty and the strong Syrian presence in 
Lebanon. By comprehending what groups influence Syrian foreign policy, one can better 
understand the circumstances that would drive Syria and Lebanon to seek peace, war, or 
maintain the status quo. This understanding of Syrian foreign policy should be a central 
element in U.S. strategy in the region. 
A. THESIS 
This thesis will accomplish two things: 
• It will determine Syria's political elite, determine its sources of power, and show 
how it influences Syrian foreign policy. In this regard, the work will focus on the 
Asad family regime since the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976, and how 
the domestic groups that allied to the regime influence Syrian foreign policy. 
• It will describe the intema 1 political conditions necessary for Syria to sign a peace 
agreement with Israel, undoubtedly the most daunting aspect of Syrian foreign 
policy. 
Syria today is an authoritarian state. In authoritarian regimes, the focus of the 
leadership is usually tre retention of power and the survival ofthe regime. Typically, the 
leadership is responsible to specific elements of society, such as the armed forces, to 
retain power. To maintain this control, the regime's supporters require patronage of one 
sort or another. To be able to dispense patronage, a regime typically requires an outside 
source of income, or state control of domestic sources of income. During the Cold War, 
alignment with the United States, as Iran and Israel did, or the Soviet Union as Syria did, 
secured this patronage. In some states with domestic sources of income such as oil, the 
2 
state retains control of the commodity and dispenses the profits to its citizenry in the form 
of goods and services. This is the case in Saudi Arabia where the government dispenses 
income derived from the state owned oil industry to the population in goods and services, 
but does not allow its citizenry to control elements of civil society. These states, known 
as rentier states, do not require civil participation in the government because the state 
produces income instead ofby taxing its citizens. Moreover, the oil wealthy states of the 
Persian Gulf usually provide external rent in the form of direct cash aid. For example, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait bolster their 'Arab credentials' to their citizenry by giving large 
amounts of cash aid to impoverished Arab states such as Syria. Regimes that receive 
such aid likewise do not have to allow for greater civil participation as the regime secures 
the wealth and dispenses it. States that receive external rents will not be under the same 
pressure to democratize than those that do not. 3 
The Syrian state under the Asad family has evolved into what Amos Perlmutter 
described as a praetorian corporatist authoritarian state. In such a regime, a coalition of 
military and civilians hold the authority of the state with an executive who may or may 
not possess military skills. Two characteristics of a praetorian corporatist regime are that 
(a) leadership seeks political support from corporate consortia and (b) leadership tolerates 
political institutions such as a civilian parliament. 4 This aptly describes the internal 
3 Giacomo Luciani, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization," in 
Democracy Without Democrats?: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan Salamah 
(New York: LB. Tauris, 1994), 131. 
4 Amos Perlmutter, Authoritarianism and Development, A Comparative Institutional Analysis. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981 ), 130-131. 
3 
politics of Syria, in which a coalition of the military, security forces, and urban business 
elite govern. This arrangement is called a military-merchant complex .5 
Syrian foreign policy under the Asad family regimes, rests on the interests of the 
'Alawi military elite and the Sunni urban business elite who compose the authoritarian 
bargain in Syria. Rather than acting on the behalf of popular public attitudes, strategic 
interests of the nation, or the whim of its president, Syrian foreign policy is the result of 
omnibalancing the interests of these two narrowly defined classes. 
The 'Alawi military elite form the backbone of the Syrian regime. Since the 
nation's independence, the Syrian military has enabled minorities to rise from poverty 
and oppression. Because of the use of minority groups in the French Mandate Troupes 
Speciales du Levant, the majority group, the Sunni Arabs, disdained military service. 
The disproportionate representation of minorities continued after Syrian independence 
when the new Syrian army was comprised mostly of former French recruited minorities. 
The urban Sunni Arab elite, as a social class, disdained military service, and through 
successive coups in the 1960's, the 'Alawi minority rose to pre-eminence. 6 Members of 
this minority make up only 12 percent of the Syrian population, but hold important 
leadership positions throughout the military and security forces. Chapter II discusses the 
makeup of the Syrian military elite-the dominant member of the authoritarian 
compact-and its interests. 
5 Glenn E. Robinson "Elite Cohesion, Regime Succession and Political Instability in Syria" 
Middle East Policy. V: 4 (January 1998), 161. Quote attributed to Sadiq al-Azm. 
6 M.E. Yapp, A History of the Near East Since the First World War 2"d edition, (London and New 
York: Longman, 1996), 98-99. 
4 
The urban Sunni business class, historically the dominant group in bilad al-sham, 
rose to prominence in the Syrian Ba'thist regime only recently because it reduced the 
state's role in the economy and it lessened the burden of financial responsibility on an 
overextended state apparatus. The irony of this sector's resurgence stems from the 
Ba'thist takeover in 1963, which marginalized the upper class and destroyed its political 
power. Following the 1963 Ba'th coup, the state expanded and created a public sector 
that controlled 75 percent of the economy and redistributed nearly 50 percent of large 
agricultural land holdings. 7 The antagonism between the regime and the Sunni urban 
business class would change under Hafiz a~ Asad. The new relationship began in the 
early 1980's, but matured in the financial crisis of 1986. During this period external rent 
support to Syria ended and the Soviet Union withdrew their patronage from the region. 
With privileged connections, this business elite has moved to the forefront of the Syrian 
economy and has become junior partners to the 'Alawi military. The rise of the business 
class since the early 1980's and how it will change Syria will be discussed in Chapter III, 
but it is worth pointing out here that balancing the competing interests in the future will 
become increasingly difficult for the regime. 
Chapter IV uses Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm as the basis for a case 
study of omnibalancing inside Syria. This case study reveals how the omnibalancing of 
the elite interests formed the decision to side with the United States' led coalition against 
7steven Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1945-1970. 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 163. 
5 
Iraq and how the elite of Syria were able to benefit from this policy. Three 
characteristics of the Gulf War earmarked its selection for analysis. 
• No Cold War competition occurred during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The 
Soviet Union's withdrawal from the region allowed each of the Soviet Union's 
former clients to pursue their own agenda. 
• Syria's decision to side with the United States is the most recent example of a 
major foreign policy decision and many of the same principals who made that 
decision remain in its government today. 
• The relationship between the military elite and urban Sunni Arab business class 
had crystallized by 1990 into its present form. Earlier case studies would need 
only account for the 'Alawi military interests, instead of both elite groups. 
This thesis will conclude with an analysis of what internal conditions inside of 
Syria will be required to successfully conduct a peace agreement with Israel. 
B. DILEMMAS FACING SYRIA 
The recent passing of President Hafiz al-A sad came at an inopportune time, 
because the mechanics of the power transition from father to son were unfinished. After 
Hafiz al-Asad died, the government quickly promoted his son, Dr. Bashar al-Asad, to 
Staff Lieutenant General (the highest military rank), and named him the commander of 
the armed forces. The Syrian constitution was amended the same day striking the 
requirements that the president be at least forty years old and a member of the Ba'th party 
Regional Command, of which Bashar al-Asad was neither. 8 
8 Brent Sadler, Andrea Koppel and The Associated Press. "Assad's son moves closer to Syrian 
Presidency." Available [Online] htru:i /www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/mcast/06/ II fassad.O I I 
6 
While the Iegime closed legal loopholes, the more fundamental issue was who 
would win the internal power struggle after Hafiz al- Asad died. The main contenders 
were the former President's son, (Lt. General Bashar al-Asad), the late President's 
brother (Rifat), and less likely, Vice President .Khaddam, who had the most legal claim to 
power as first Vice-President. Following an expected landslide victory, the government 
swore in Dr. Bashar al-Asad as the Syrian President on 17 July 2000. While it seems the 
power transition is complete, President Bashar al- Asad must still be cautious to ensure 
that he retains his office. 
Since 1995, military retirements and house arrests had been increasing. For 
example, 'Ali Haydar, formerly the commanding general of Syria's Special Forces, was 
summarily dismissed in 1995 for insubordination, which given his rank, equates to 
sedition. 9 The London Foreign Report stated that in October of 1999, a large scale 
military engagement occurred between forces loyal to Rifat al-Asad and a brigade 
commanded by then Staff Col. Bashar al- Asad at Rifat' s private estate compound and 
port facility in Latakia.lO This engagement, which took place less than a year ago, should 
give pause to any notion of an air of domestic tranquility. 
9 Alain Chouet, "Alawi Tribal Space Tested by Power: Disintegration by Politics" (text) Paris 
Monde Arabe: Maghreb-Machrek in French (Jan-Mar 95). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Online Database- Near East South Asia 30 April 1997 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-
FTS 1997043000 1572). 
10 Unattributed, "Rifat-Bashar Rivalry; Syrian Economic Crisis Seen" (text) London London 
Foreign Report in English (11 January 2000). Transcribed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 




The Muslim Brotherhood, which undertook the only serious effort to overthrow 
the Asad regime in the early 1980's, is probably the only non-elite group with any 
foundation for support. That the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood maintains 
offices in London, rather than the Middle East is a testament to the success of the regime 
in crushing the Brotherhood's uprising. Recent pronouncements from Ali Sadr al-Din al-
Bayanuni, the Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement of Syria, have 
been supportive of the new regime leadership and the measures it has taken. II 
Internal politics and personnel changes have shown that Bashar al-Asad, who 
headed the government's anti-corruption campaign, clearly has assumed control of the 
government. For example, in early March of 2000, former Prime Minister Mahmud al-
Zubi resigned his position. 12 A few days later, President Asad named a new cabinet in 
which Defense Minister Mustafa T'las was the only Ba'th Party Regional Command 
member. Prime Minister Mustafa Miru, who was not a member of the Ba'th party 
Regional Command, now heads the new cabinet. Other members of the new cabinet are 
closely associated with Bashar al-Asad.13 Two months after he resigned his cabinet 
11 Tawfiq Taha, "Syrian MB Leader Cites Positive Indications, Cause for Optimism in Syria." 
(text) Doha AI Jazeera Satellite Channel Television in Arabic. (17 July 2000) Translation by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Online Database- Near East 17 July 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-
GMP20000717000099). 
12 Unattributed, "Previous Syrian Governments Changed Ministers for Misusing Public Funds" 
(text) London Al-Sharg al-Awsat in Arabic (10 March 2000). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Online Data base -Near East South Asia 10 March 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-
GMP2000031 0000089). 
13 Ibrahim Humaydi, "Syrian Official: The Ba'th Conference Will Catch Up with Domestic 
Changes," (text) London AI Hayah in Arabic (10 May 2000). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 
Infonmtion Service. FBIS Online Database- Near East South Asia I 0 May 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-
GMP2000051 0000091 ). 
8 
position, the Ba'th Party's Regional Command expelled former Prime Minister Zubi from 
the party on charges of corruption during his fifteen-year tenure as Prime Minister.14 A 
week and a half later while under house arrest, al- Zubi died, reportedly a suicide. 15 
There can be no doubt that the death of Hafiz al-Asad has caused considerable 
confusion in the regime. How disruptive it will be depends on the number of changes 
made and the extent to which they achieve their intended results. Bashar al-Asad is 
strengthening his position, with each passing day of calm in the regime. Recent 
pronouncements by Rifat al-Asad claiming he will take his position as the President are 
probably empty threats. If Rifat al-Asad's position were strong, he would not make overt 
claims. He would simply act. 
The elevation of Bashar to the Presidency after Hafiz al-Asad died is of secondary 
interest to the members of the authoritarian bargain. Like his father, Bashar must also 
address the needs of his main supporters. The recent retirements, arrests, and Zubi' s 
death, is the result of jockeying within the elite leadership for influence and power. The 
elevation of Bashar al-Asad maintained the status quo of a system that has successfully 
ensured the interests of the elite leadership in Syria. Bashar al-Asad' s longevity is 
directly proportional to the support he receives from the military-merchant complex. As 
14 Unattributed, "Previous Syrian Governments Changed Ministers for Misusing Public Funds" 
(text) London Al-Sharo al-Awsat in Arabic (10 March 2000). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Online Data base -Near East South Asia 10 March 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-
GMP2000031 0000089). 
15Penny Campbell, "Milestones." Available [Online] 
http://www.timc.com/timc/magazinc/articlcs/0 3 ">66 4 7314 OO.html 
9 
with other issues, Syria's foreign policy is not solely dependent upon the personal 
position of its leader, be it either Hafiz al- Asad or his son Bashar. 
Given the lack of political opposition to the regime inside Syria's borders, it is 
equally doubtful that a popular uprising will occur or some form of popular democratic 
movement will emerge. One wealthy Damascene merchant recently replied to the 
prospects of future democratization this "My, " ... not only do I not think so, but I do not 
want it. All we want is economic freedom and political stability."i6 The Sunni's richest 
elements have closely tied themselves to the regime and accordingly, they want the status 
quo maintained. Any serious threat to Bashar al-Asad's assumption of power will come 
from inside the elite itself 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The system in the Middle East is a status quo system in which, negotiation 
resolves differences, not fighting, to ensure stability in the region The current political 
situation in the Middle East has evolved into a consortium of states either formally allied 
with the United States, such as Israel and Turkey, or states with strong economic and 
military ties to the United States such as Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Syria 
has become a 'perimeter state,' neither inside the sphere of the United States nor a 
'contained state' such as Iraq or Iran. In such a system, Syria would put its needs before 
those of any regional system. Syria does not face the loss of U.S. support; it can only be 
16 Joseph Blahout, "The Syrian Business Community, Its Politics and Prospects" in Eberhard 
Kienle (ed.) Contemporary Syria, Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace. (New York: British 
Academic Press, 1994), 80. 
10 
offered incentives to join the U.S. system. An analysis of Syria's internal dynamics is 
required to assess its foreign policy decisions. 
Neo-realist theories of international relations contend that individual states, as 
actors, will balance the system in which it operates. Moreover, states' actions will 
rebalance the system if any disruptions occur. Another aspect of neo-realist theory is that, 
since states operate in a competitive system, they will often imitate their competitors. 17 
However, neo-realist theory, while broadly applicable to international relations, 
overlooks the fine distinctions in the foreign policy decision- making processes of third-
world regimes, including those of the Middle East. 
Neo-realism accurately portrays the international arena as competitive; that is, 
individual states compete as simple units in the system. While no two states are identical, 
neo-realist theory treats these differences as "variations among like units."l8 These 
variations however, can be extremely important when discerning the relations among 
states. Neo-realist theory contends that states will attempt to align themselves to resist 
external threats. This was certainly true of European politics of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, and of Cold War politics during the last fifty years. 
As neo-realists would expect, regimes of the third-world face these same concerns 
and act in much the same way. However, there is oftentimes a difference in the nature of 
third-world regimes. This difference is also a fundamental element in their foreign policy 
making decisions. Internal as well as external forces can threaten the survival of a third-
17 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relation. (New York: Random House, 1979), 128. 
l8 Ibid., 98. 
11 
world regime. In such a situation, a third-world regime must align to protect itself from 
both threats or face its demise.19 Neo-realist theory predicates the actions of the state on 
the belief that the government is the legitimate authority in the state. 20 This relationship 
is true in most nations, but many third world regimes lack political legitimacy. Because 
of weak political legitimacy, many third-world regimes must continually face threats 
from internal and external forces. More often than not, a regime change in the third 
world results in its leadership's death instead of its peaceful retirement. 21 
To stay in power, third world regimes are often oppressive and harsh. This is true 
in the case of Syria, a police state dominated by security services loyal to a regime that 
fears its demise will be due to internal factors as much if not more than by external 
powers. As such, this thesis uses a methodology drawn from Steven R. David's 
Alignment and Choosing Sides, Realignment in the Third World, to reveal how Syria's 
internal dynamics influence its foreign policy. The author's argument, called 
'omnibalancing,' is based on a study of third world nations' political alignments with 
each other during the later stages of the Cold War. 
Omnibalancing is chosen as the methodology because it bridges the gap between 
internal and external politics to explain foreign policy. This thesis applies David's 
argument for omnibalancing to third world regimes' leadership, since, to remain in 
19 Steven R. David, Choosing Sides, Alignment and Re-Alignment in the Third World. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991 ), 7. 
20 Waltz, 105. 
21 David, 12-13. 
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power, the leadership must look at both external threats, and internal threats. David 
argues that, "the most powerful determinant of alignment is the desire of third world 
leaders to ensure their political and physical survival."22 This thesis applies the 
omnibalancing argument to Syria by focusing on the two key groups of the Syrian elite. 
The argument is conditioned in that the political legitimacy of the leadership is weak and 
the stakes, (such as regime survival) are high. Omnibalancing focuses on the leadership 
of the state, and not the state itself as the unit of analysis. This is critical to the argument 
because the interests of the two are not necessarily similar. David's argument stresses 
that when given the choice between decisions that would harm the state, but retain a 
regime's hold on power, or a decision that would benefit the state but endanger the 
regime's hold on power, the leadership would choose its own interests over the 'national 
interest.' 23 
David's argument is partitioned into three dimensions: regimes that face internal 
threats, external threats, or a combination of both. 24 Given the current political situation 
in the Middle East with Syria on the perimeter of U.S. backed states but reservedly 
participating in the Middle East peace process; this thesis asserts that U.S. backed nations 
because they are susceptible to U.S. pressure, would refrain from open warfare against 
Syria. In turn, Syria, because it realizes the enormity of the military strength of its 
probable opponents (Israel and Turkey), would refrain from initiating direct hostilities. 
22 Ibid., 10. 
23 Ibid., 16. 
24 Ibid., 7-8. 
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Thus, Syria, by its own restraint, obviates external threats, and therefore the regime 
would tum to balancing its internal dynamics. 
Stability is measured by the extent to which the regime leadership is able to 
satisfy the interests of the 'Alawi officers and Sunni businessmen. The military elite and 
urban Sunni business class are pillars of support, but they also are a threat as well, 
because losing support from one or both groups is as dangerous to the Syrian leadership 
as are external threats. 
Maintaining a balance of internal factors drives Syria's foreign policy. 
Hypothetically, if Syria were to go to war with any adversary, presumably the interests of 
the Sunni urban business elite would be subjugated to those of the military elite, thus 
upsetting the balance. Simultaneously, the choice of peace could upset the internal 
balance as well because it would favor the interests of the business class. Syria maintains 
its internal balance with a policy of 'no war, no peace' concerning Israel, which has been 
in effect since 1974. Pursuing a peace agree~nt with Israel could conceivably upset the 
internal balance, unless Syria pursued a policy that would satisfy its own military. 
As long as the Asad family meets their interests, the military and business elites 
will support the Syrian regime. As much as the leadership of the regime needs these two 
elements to remain in power, the elite groups require the present structure of politics to 
flourish. Regardless of the leader, these two pillars of Syrian politics exist. Their 
interests are concomitantly tre interests of the Syrian Arab Republic. 
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II. THE 'ALA WI MILITARY ELITE 
The Syrian military, conducting coups since its independence, has become a 
bastion of minority power. Beginning with the French Mandate's Troupes Speciales du 
Levant, minorities utilized the military as a ladder to climb from their poverty. Through 
successive coups in the 1950's and 60's, each particular minority, Druze, Isama'ili and 
others had been reduced in strength leaving only the 'Alawi in control. 25 
Following the coup d'etat of Hafiz al-Asad in 1970, the new leader strategically 
placed loyal 'Alawi officers in the most sensitive positions, including Asad's brothers 
who were appointed to "eminent positions in the army.''26 The commanders of the most 
powerful army and Special Forces elements were not only loyal to Asad but hail from the 
same region and tribal background as the President. 27 
Hafiz al-Asad deemed that a strong authoritarian state was necessary in the never-
ending struggle against Israel. According to Nikolaos Van Dam, Hafiz al-Asad sought to 
unify the Arab nations surrounding Israel as well as others to present " a unified military 
and political front against Israel.''28 Asad was able to do this only after instituting a 
25 M.E. Yapp, A History of the Near East Since the First World War, 2nd edition, (London and 
New York: Longman, 1996), 254-255. 
26 Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, Politics and Society under Asad and the 
Ba'th Party, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 70-71. 
27 Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under As ad, (London and New York: I.B. 
Taurus, 1995), 182. 
28 Van Dam, 71. 
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regime described by Anwar Sadat as "firstly 'Alawi, secondly Ba'thist, and thirdly 
Syrian. ''29 It is the 'Alawi military elite that control the elements of state power. 
A. 'ALA WI MILITARY ELITE TIES TO THE REGIME 
The 'Alawi military elite is closely aligned to the regime leadership not only 
ethnically, but through tribal alliances, marriage, and personal ties. 'Alawi military 
officers can be aligned with the leadership in all four respects, such as Ghazi Kan' an who 
overseas the Syrian military security forces in Lebanon. Ethnically, he is an 'Alawi ani 
hails from the same tribe as the Asad family, the al-Kalbiyah. Kan'an's son is married to 
a daughter of Jamil al-Asad, brother to the late president. Kan'an has close personal ties 
to the Syrian presidency due to his position as the virtual military governor of Lebanon. 
In this position, Kan'an reported directly to President Hafiz al-Asad, rather than through 
the head of Syria's mukahbarat, 'Ali Duba. Duba was recently retired and this 
arrangement may have changed in light of his replacement, Major General Asif Shawkat, 
the brother- in-law of President Bashar al- Asad. 30 
While the military elite are mostly 'Alawi, some prominent positions are held by 
Sunni Arabs as well. The placement of Sunni Arabs provides a face of diversity to the 
'Alawi military, tl::ese are 'token' Sunnis. Personal ties or family marriages integrate 
high-ranking Sunni's to the regime. An example is Mustafa T'las, the Syrian Minister of 
29lbid., 73. 
30 Unattributed, "Report Doubts Syria Capable of Peace" (text) Paris AI Arabi in Arabic (18 
February 2000). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Online Data Base-
Near East 18 February 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS -GMP20000217000160). 
16 
Defense, and long time friend to Hafiz al-Asad since their days in the military academy 
together. Another is the former Army Chief of Staff, Hikmat al-Shihabi, also a Sunni 
Arab and friend to the late president since the academy. Shihabi recently retired, being 
replaced by his long time deputy, 'Ali Asian who is an 'Alawi and close associate of the 
Asad family. Vice-President 'Abd al-Halim-Khaddam, a Sunni Arab from Damascus, 
has played a skillful role in garnering Sunni support for the regime. Khaddam's oldest 
son Jamal is married to a niece of Muhammad Nasif. Nasif is an 'Alawi, leader of the 
Khayer-Bek tribe, and is the head of Syria's internal security apparatus.31 
In the five years leading up to Hafiz al-Asad's death, officers closely connected to 
the new president have replaced many of the older generation military elite. Recent 
retirees such as 'Ali Duba, Hikmat al-Shihabi, and Ali Haydar, former Commander of the 
Syrian Special Forces, were powerful military commanders holding sensitive posts. That 
the new president had them removed displayed the fragility of the system, but that he was 
successful in doing so displays the strength of his position. In each case, the retirees were 
replaced by officers with deeper ties to the regime, either ethnically such as 'Ali Asian an 
'Alawi, or through marriage and family such as Asif Shawkat, an 'Alawi ani the new 
president's brother- in-law. 
While Sadat' s description of the Syrian regime may be accurate, it is also accurate 
that the regime's 'Alawi elite do not exercise power on behalf of the 'Alawi 
31 Alain Chouet, "Alawi Tribal Space Tested by Power: Disintegration by Politics" (text) Paris 
Monde Arabe: Maghreb-Machrek in French (Jan-Mar 95). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Online Data Base- Near East South Asia 30 April 1997 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-
FTS19970430001572). 
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community. 32 Hafiz al- Asad inherited an underdeveloped authoritarian state that 
regularly experienced military coups. Under his leadership, he industrialized the Syrian 
economy and solidified the regime's control over the military. The state's GDP increased 
by more than 75 percent since Hafiz al-Asad took power, a growth of 81 million LS in 
the period from 1970 to 1992.33 While the 'Alawi population of Syria certainly benefited 
from the Asad regime, government programs and policies were developed along social 
classes (peasant versus wealthy) rather then along confessional lines. 34 
Though the regime is dominated by the 'Alawi ethnic group, it is not monolithic 
but rather an example of a particular ethnic group able to utilize the institutions of the 
state and then shape them to .maintain their pre-eminence. This s:atus is preserved 
through the political machinery of the Ba'th party itself, which predates the rise of the 
'Alawi. The regime has most recently allowed a broadening role for non-Ba'th parties to 
enter government under the umbrella of the National Progressive Front, though the Ba'th 
party maintains the majority in the People's Assembly. 
Government policies, aimed at strengthening the economy of Syria, opened the 
economy to the private sector, especially during the mid 1980's. This came about due to 
the loss of external rents in the form of cash aid from Arab oil states and the withdrawal 
of the Soviet Union and its support. Consequently, the urban business class assumed a 
32 David Waldner, State Building and Late Development. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), 75. 
33 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, (table) 25. 
34 Waldner, 75. 
18 
greater role in the economy forging what has been termed the "military-merchant 
complex."35 (See Ch. III) It should be clear however, that this relationship enjoins the 
business class as a junior partner while the 'Alawi military barons retain the elements of 
coercion in the state. Bashar al- Asad's promotion to the presidency is evidence that the 
military elite directs political events. In the decisive moments following Hafiz al-Asad's 
death, Mustafa T'las explained in a recent interview how he managed the transfer of 
power. In a meeting comprised of the Army Chief of Staff, 'Ali Asbn, the Speaker of the 
Peoples Assembly, the Syrian vice-presidents, and leaders of the Ba'th Party Regional 
Command, T'las informed the individuals how the transfer of power would work. The 
Minister of Defense directed the Speaker of the Assembly to amerrl the constitution to 
change the age requirement of the president from forty to thirty- four years of age, and 
announce the promotion of Staff Colonel Bashar al-Asad to Lieutenant General and 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. 36 The rapidity and efficiency with which these 
events occurred show how strongly the elite leadership is entrenched in the system. That 
no business leaders were included in the cabal highlights their secondary position in the 
authoritarian bargain. 
35 Glenn E. Robinson "Elite Cohesion, Regime Succession and Political Instability in Syria" 
Middle East Policy. V: 4 (January 1998), quote attributed to Sadiq al-Azm. 
36 Am in Muhammad Amin, "Interview with Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa T'las" (text) Cairo 
Al-Ahram in Arabic (15 July 2000). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS 
Online Data Base- Near East 15 July 2000 (PreEx 7.10: FBIS-GMP20000725000205). 
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B. 'ALA WI MILITARY ELITE INTERESTS 
Militaries are responsible for the physical protection of nations throughout the 
world to guard against external enemies. The military looks beyond its borders to 
identify their adversaries and determine what they require to defend against them. This is 
no less the case in the Middle East and Syria. 
1. Military Role as Protector 
In 1982, Israel conducted Operation Peace for Galilee to destroy the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon. Due to Syria's intervention in the Lebanese 
civil war in 1976, Syria maintained a large military presence in Lebanon. Inevitably, 
military engagements between Syria and Israel occurred. 
Though the Syrian Air Force was handily defeated in Lebanon during Operation 
Peace for Galilee, they nonetheless continued fighting despite heavy losses. Patrick 
Seale quotes an Israeli pilot involved, that the Syrians "knew they had no chance against 
us, yet kept coming ... they showed remarkable dedication and courage, I have nothing but 
respect for them."37 Syrian ground forces matched this tenacity as well. The military 
fought because of the tenuous position of the regime at the time. In Syria, security forces 
crushed the Muslim Brotherhood uprising at Hama in February of the same year. A 
Syrian defeat in Lebanon could have proved destabilizing to the regime and so it fought 
37 Seale, as quoted in "A sad, Struggle for the Middle East, "(Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), 381. 
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back tenaciously, and succeeded in abrogating the Israeli-Lebanon Accord of 1982.38 
Israel's withdrawal to southern Lebanon and its self declared "security zone" ended the 
saga. 
Following the Syrian-Israeli clashes in Lebanon, the Soviet Union quickly 
replaced and increased the Syrian military inventory, nearly doubling its former stocks 
and included medium range surface-to-surface missiles.39 The vast improvements in the 
Syrian military inventory gave pause to further Israeli attacks when they seemed 
imminent in 1983. Israel had been quickly tiring of the attrition warfare on the ground in 
Lebanon with the different Arab factions and did not want any further confrontation over 
the new Syrian missiles. Israel's Chief of Staff at the time, General Eitan stated, "We 
have no intention of going to war against Syria over the new missiles or for any other 
reason."40 Indeed, since Operation Peace for Galilee, Syrian and Israeli military 
engagements have been limited to troop movements and saber rattling. 
The Syrian military has been the recipient of the Middle East's largest arms 
transfers. Regardless of the political environment of the region, the Syrian regime has 
supported the armed forces with equipmett both during periods of heightened tension, as 
well as during peace negotiations. 
38 Moshe Ma'oz, "Syria and Israel, From War to Peacemaking," (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), 177-179. 
39 Ibid., 398-399. 
40 Seale, as quoted in "Asad, Struggle for the Middle East," 400. 
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Following the Iraqi defeat by the U.S. led coalition in the Second Persian Gulf 
War; the Syrian regime purchased massive amounts of weaponry with the cash aid it 
received for its participation. 41 This came at the same period as Syria's acceptance and 
participation in the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991.42 Through the 1990's, Syria's 
military spending equated to 8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at over $800 
million. These are the official numbers; the actual numbers are most likely significantly 
higher. This level of spending is commensurate with other nations military spending in 
the region such as Israel at 9.5 percent ofits GDP, Jordan at 7.8 percent and Egypt at 8.2 
percent. 43 Military spending of this sort could simply be the regime hedging its bets on 
the outcome of the peace talks, but Samuel P. Huntington gives a better reason: 
The concern of military men with the dangers to national security leads 
them to urge the enlarging and strengthening of the military forces 
available to protect the security of the state. The most common 
manifestation of this is the demand for a larger share of the defense budget. 44 
The military is the strongest element of power in the Syrian regime and as such 
represents a powerful interest group. To confront its perceived enemy, Israel, the military 
pushed for expansive military budgets. 45 
41 See Chapter IV, page 67 on the Syrian military buildup and weapon acquisitions following the 
Second Gulf War. 
42 Anovshiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch. Syria and Iran, Middle Powers in a 
Penetrated Regional System, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 84. 
43ciA World Factbook, Available [Online] 
http://www.odci.gov/cia!publicationslfactbook/gcos/sv.html#Military, Accessed 18 September 2000. 
44 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), 67. 
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2. Perception of Rising Threats 
Given the military's role as the protector of the nation, it seeks an external enemy 
against whom it should defend. Historically in Syria, the role of the state's enemy has 
been Israel. This thesis will not dwell on the history of conflict between Syria and Israel. 
Many sources have already covered the conflict in detail. 
Since the signing of a joint defensive pact between Israel and Turkey in 1996, a 
new regional system of alliances is developing. A triangle ofU.S. backed or allied states 
consisting of Israel, Turkey and Jordan have increased their level of cooperation and 
military participation in recent years. In May of 2000, the Israeli Defense Forces sent 
military officers to observe joint Turkish and Jordanian military maneuvers in the 
Jordanian desert. Though Israel does not maintain a military attache in Amman, the level 
of military cooperation is "serious" by IDF sources. 46 While the elements of conflict 
with Israel are well known, Syria also has three serious concerns with Turkey regarding 
territory, terrorism, and water rights. 
To prevent Turkey from siding with Germany before World War II, the 1939 
Franco- Turkish treaty ceded the province of Alexandretta, part of Mandate Syria, to 
Turkey as a conciliatory gesture. 47 Electoral roles of the time showed the area to have an 
45 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba 'thist Syria: Army, 
Party, and Peasant. (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), 162. 
46 Arieh O'Sullivan, "IDF To Observe Turkey-Jordan Exercise," (text) Jerusalem, Jerusalem Post 
in English (24 April2000) Transcribed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Online 
Database- Near East South Asia West Europe, 24 April2000 (PreEx 7.10: FBIS-
GMP2000042400004 7). 
47 Yapp, 96. 
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Arab majority, until the signing of the treaty and seizure of the province by Turkish 
troops, whereupon Turks became the majority. 48 Syria has always considered 
Alexandretta, called Hatay by Turkey, to be an integral part of Syria. 49 This is still a 
relevant issue today. A leading Turkish daily, Istanbul Sabah, aired its concerns over the 
recent Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations in an article. The author equated the Golan 
Heights with Hatay fearing that if Syria were to conclude a peace with Jerusalem, it 
would turn around and demand Hatay from Ankara, possibly dragging it to international 
courts to regain it. 50 
The second issue concerns the presence of the Kurdish populations that reside in 
Syria and Turkey. The former leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), Abdallah 
Ocalan, operated from Syria against Turkish authorities before his apprehension in 1998. 
From his Syrian refuge, Ocalan coordinated PKK terrorist attacks throughout the 1980's 
and 1990's. The Kurdish separatist movement in southeastern Turkey, 5,000 to 10,000 
armed guerillas, necessitated large-scale Turkish military excursions to suppress it.51 
Most recently, the Istanbul Cumhuriyet reported on talks between the new Chairman of 
48 Seale, 27-28. 
49 Derek Hopwood, Syria, 1945-1986, Politics and Society. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 27. 
50 Sedat Sertoglu, "Israel-Syria" (text) Ankara Istanbul Sabah (Ankara edition) in Turkish (22 
December 1999). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service .. FBIS Online Data Base-
West Europe Near East South Asia 22 December 1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- FTS19991227001216). 
51 Yapp, 482-483. 
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the PKK, Cemil Bayik, and high-ranking Syrian officials. The PKK has requested more 
support from Syria and that Syria re-open a PKK training camp near Damascus. 52 
The third area of contention between Syria and Turkey is the issue of water, its 
rights, and uses. The Euphrates River, which runs through Syria on its way to the Persian 
Gulf, begins in Turkey, and provides 80 percent of Syria's water resources. 53 Syria has 
accused Turkey of halting or diverting the flow of water as part of its Greater Anatolia 
Water Project of dam building in southeastern Turkey. The construction of dams along 
the Euphrates enables Turkey to determine the amount of water its downstream users will 
receive. 
These strains have kept Syriafr Turkish relations cool. In October of 1998, 
tensions were high enough between the states that Hosni Mubarak flew to Damascus on 
short notice to appeal to the Syrian regime to calm itself. Turkish officials stated that 
differences with Syria "had reached the stage of undeclared war.''54 
The military pact between Turkey and Israel exacerbate these issues. Turkey has 
much to lose by a peace between Syria and Israel. Following such an agreement, Turkey 
would lose its standing as a strategic ally of Israel unable to "open a second front against 
52 Alper Balli, "Cemil Bayik Causes Tension Between Ankara and Damascus" (text) Ankara 
Istanbul Cumhuriyet (Ankara edition) in Turkish (1 July 2000). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service. FBIS Online Data Base- West Europe Near East South Asia I July 2000 (PrEx 
7.10: FBIS- GMP2000070I000068). 
53 Hopwood, 3. 
54 Stephen Kinzer, 'Turkey's Ties to Syria Sink to War in All but Name" in The New York Times, 
(4 October I998, Sunday, Late Edition, Section I, p. I7, column I) LEXIS/NEXIS search 22 May 2000 
Lib: News. 
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Syria's northern sector."55 Turkey fears that a Syrian-Israeli peace would result in 
Syria's removal from the list of countries supporting terrorism, which would hurt 
Turkey's fight against the PKK. Additionally, with U.S. backing, Syria could apply 
pressure on Turkey concerning Euphrates water rights. 56 
The history of Syrian-Jordanian relations has been spotty since Hafiz al-Asad's 
assumption of power. The most recent example was Jordan's neutrality in the U.S. led 
coalition against Iraq, which Syria supported, and .then Jordan's defection from the 
unified Arab negotiating position at the 1991 Madri:l Peace Conference. 57 
The Jordanian tact of negotiating a separate peace with Israel following the 
Madrid Conference of 1991, (as well as the Palestinians) undercut the Syrian pledge of 
not abandoning any Arab states to bilateral negotiations. President Hafiz al-Asad had 
stated that Syria would treat issues vital to the other states as if they were vital to Syria. 58 
The desertion of Jordan and subsequent reconciliatory gestures to Israel heightened 
Syria's isolation. Jordan's current relationship with Israel is a legacy of the late King 
Hussein's policies. Only after King Abdullah II is firmly established will he shape his 
55 Celik, Hakan, "Peace in Middle East Ris/...y for Turkey," (text) Ankara Istanbul Posta (Ankara 
edition) in Turkish (11 January 2000). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS 
Online Data Base- West Europe Near East South Asia 11 January 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-
FTS20000112000915). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ian J. Bickerton and Carla Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 3rd ed., 
(Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), 285-286. 
58 Fred Lawson, "Domestic Pressures and the Peace Process, Fillip or Hindrance?" in Eberhard 
Kienle (ed.), Contemporary Syria, Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace, (New York: British 
Academic Press, 1994), 143. 
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own foreign policy. One must keep in mind that with the Jordanian population, rumored 
to be as high as 70 percent Palestinian; King Abdullah must establish his own Arab 
credentials to his constituency. Recent interviews with King Abdullah II indicate that he 
is taking a more nonpartisan approach to Middle East politics by playing the role of 
mediator to requesting parties. 59 
While the potential for conflict between Syria and its neighbors is admittedly low, 
the military elite will not want to seem weak to the nation relative to its neighbors. The 
military simply wants to be strong enough to deter pressure that the surrounding states 
could exert. Hafiz al-Asad built a regionally strong military during his thirty-year tenure. 
The military, as protectors of the national sovereignty, will not want to see any reduction 
in readiness. 
C. ROLE OF LEBANON 
In the broadest of terms, Lebanon is ore of, if not the key interest for the Syrian 
'Alawi military elite. Lebanon provides the leadership with a source of patronage with 
which to reward its military pillar of support. 
The breakdown of Lebanon's fragile confessional system began in 1975 with 
Muslim resentment of the Christian minority's dominance of government. An important 
aspect of the civil war was the presence of over 350,000 Palestinian refugees and 
59 Abd ai-Bari Atwan, "Report on an Interview with King Abdallah II of Jordan," (text) London 
AI Ouds al Arabi in Arabic (19 July 2000). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
FBIS Online Data Base- Near East. 19 July 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS GMP20000719000022). 
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displaced persons. 60 Syria intervened militarily to prevent Israel from doing so. This 
intervention came on the heels of the Sinai II agreement, which removed Egypt from the 
Arab struggle with Israel. 61 The Syrian intervention exemplified realpolitik. Gaining the 
upper hand in Lebanon before Israel, controlling the various factions, and ending the 
fighting would negate any Israeli temptation to do likewise. Hafiz a~Asad was fearful of 
an Israeli attempt to use the destabilization in Lebanon as an excuse to partition it in 
Israel's quest for greater Israel. 62 Ironically, Syria's intervention into Lebanon was to 
support Christian forces desperately outgunned by the Palestinians and other Lebanese 
factions. The result was Syria gaining its foothold in Lebanon, becoming a major power 
broker in the region, and protecting the approaches to Damascus from Beirut. 63 
The Ta'if Accord of October 1989 solidified Syria's dominance of Lebanon. 
Following the expiration of Amin Jumayil's term as Lebanon's president, and without an 
elected successor, Jumayil appointed General Michel 'Awn as the Prime Minister of an 
interim government. 'Awn's appointment as Prime Minister resulted in two governments 
existing in Lebanon at the same time with Salim al-Huss as the existing Prime Minister 
from the Jumayil government. 'Awn was anti-Syrian and marshaled his forces to oust the 
Syrians and pro-Syrian forces. The resulting clashes caused the Arab League to take the 
60 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Middle East- Lebanon", Available 
[Online]: http://www.unhcr.chiworldfmidcllcbanon.htm accessed 18 September 2000. 
61 Seale, 271-273. 
62 Ibid., 275. 
63 Malik Mufti, "Sovereign Creations, Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq." 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 240. 
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matter into a committee composed of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, with Syrian 
and Lebanese participation. The resulting agreement known as Ta'if or the Charter of 
National Reconciliation affirmed Lebanese sovereignty, but also provided for a special 
relationship with Syria in foreign policy, security, economic affairs, and other agenda. 
'Awn and other militia groups that opposed the Syrian presence rejected the agreement. 64 
1. 'Alawi Military Interests in Lebanon 
The Syrian regime has paid significantly in blood and treasure for its stake in 
Lebanon. The initial intervention in 1976 was widely unpopular in Syria, but the regime 
saw it as necessary to provide stability and prevent Israeli intervention. 65 Though Israel 
invaded nonetheless, the Syrian regime fought back and retained its position in Lebanon. 
The popular discontent that initially occurred is no longer evident in Syria, even 
with the presence of nearly 30,000 troops stationed in Lebanon. Indeed, in the military 
itself, officers compete for service in the Biqa Valley. The cause behind this appreciation 
in the military for Lebanon is the drug and smuggling trade. 
Before the Lebanese Civil War, the Biqa Valley was an agriculturally diverse 
region, responsible for much of pre-war Lebanon's prosperity. The Biqa Valley in 
Lebanon contains 40 percent of Lebanon's cultivable land and is its most agriculturally 
productive region. Wheat production in the Biqa Valley in 1974 produced 74,000 tons. 
64 Fidah Nisrallah, "Syria after Ta'if: Lebanon and the Lebanese in Syria" in Eberhard Kienle 
(ed.), Contemporary Syria, Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace. (New York: British 
Academic Press, 1994), 132-134. 
65 Volker Perthes, "The Political Economy of Syria under Asad," 176. 
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As civil society broke down during the war, a significant portion of arable land was 
cultivated for illicit drugs as a profitable cash crop. In 1987, wheat production had fallen 
to 9,000 tons. Hashish cultivation in 1975, which had equated to nearly 30,000 tons, rose 
to 100,000 tons in the early 1980's. By 1987, opium had begun to replace hashish as a 
more profitable crop. 66 An estimate by Fred Lawson of the profits and kickbacks for the 
Syrian military and security forces in control of the narcotics trade, has been valued at 
nearly $2 billion a year. 67 The Lebanese banking system launders and distributes the 
profits from the drug traffic. Powerful Syrians connected to the drug trade include 
Mustafa T'las, the Defense Minister of Syria, and Rifat al-Asad, brother ofthe late Syrian 
President. 68 By 1984, the money derived from control of the drug trade was so 
extravagant that the regime set limits on the military contraband trade. 69 
Under pressure from the United States in the early 1990's to put an end to the 
drug trade, "the Syrian and Lebanese governments decided ... to change the character of 
the drug trade in Lebanon." Simply put, the authorities ended cultivation and increased 
production. The inflow of raw opium and cocaine to Lebanon offset the drastic reduction 
in the cultivation of opium and cannabis. By 1994, no processing facilities had been 
66 John Roberts, "The Economy" in Lebanon: A Country Study, 3rd ed. Edited by Thomas 
Collelo, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 120-122. 
67 Fred Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War; Thirty Years of Confrontation, (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), 145-146. 
68 Reuven Erlich, Terror and Crime in Lebanon: Available [Online]: 
www.ict.org.illarticlcsicrimc2.htm 
69 Volker Perthes, "The Political Economy ofSyria under Asad," 186. 
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dismantled, rather they had increased significantly. 70 By 1995, Lebanon became the 
Middle East processing center for South American cocaine and Southwest Asian heroin, 
with the final product shipped to Europe. 71 
The latest U.S. Department of Justice report, named Syria as a known transit point 
for opium and morphine base en route to the Biqa Valley. Ironically, the U.S. 
Department of Justice believes that Russian immigrants to Israel fostered the growth of 
the trade in Lebanon, specifically because of the Lebanese banking secrecy laws, which 
are similar to those of Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. In the same report of 1998, 
the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that Syrian authorities and military personnel 
tolerated and facilitated the drug trade. 72 
Given the large amount of Syrian forces in Lebanon, the incentives provided by 
their presence, and the involvement of leaders closely associated with the regime, it is 
doubtful that the Syrian regime will retain its dominance over Lebanon and thwart efforts 
to change that situation. In an interview with the Amman, Jordan newspaper, Al-Arab AI 
Yawm, Abd al-Qadir Qaddurah, speaker of the Syrian Peoples Assembly, spoke on the 
recent Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Asked if Syrian forces were also 
70 U.S. Department of State, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1996." 
Available [Online]: http://www.statc.gov/www/global!narcotics law/1996 narc rcport/afnnc96.html 
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planning to withdraw, Qaddurah replied, "this is an Arab army that is deployed on an 
Arab land with the approval of its government and its people."73 
Lebanon represents the ultimate in payoff for the military. As a key source of 
patronage for the military elite, Damascus looks the other way while officers enrich 
themselves and in return, maintain their loyalty to the regime. 74 
D. MILITARY ELITE INTERESTS IN A PEACE AGREEMENT 
The 'Alawi elite hold the means of coercion in Syria; they are the senior partners 
in Syria's praetori:;n corporate state. In the thirty years of Asad family rule, the military 
has overseen the most political stability that Syria has ever known. At the same time, the 
leadership has prcfited from their positions especially with respect to Lebanon. 
The wea\.: of interpersonal relationships of the military elite and the Asad family 
is very strong, consisting of ethnic, tribal, and personal ties. This group would wish to 
see their position or that of the Asad family unaltered; they would want to maintain the 
status quo. 
The military status quo would necessitate that Syria retains its position m 
Lebanon. It is a source of valuable patronage from the leadership to the military. Any 
attempt to separate the Lebanese and Syrian tracks of a peace agreement could destabilize 
Lebanon and cause Syria to withdraw from any negotiations. Were the Asad family to 
73 As' ad AI-Azzuni, "Interview with Abd-al-Qadir Qaddurah, Speaker of the Syrian People's 
Assembly," (text) Amman AI-Arab al-Yawm in Arabic (9 May 2000) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 
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GMP20000509000111). 
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deny Lebanon to its military pillar of support, it is doubtful that the family leadership 
would survive intact. 
A peace agreement with Israel should also not degrade the military in terms of 
size, equipment, or deployment. As witnessed by the Israeli- Jordanian Peace Agreement 
of 1994, Jordan received 16 F-16 fighter jets as its reward at an estimated cost of $200 
million. 75 It seems unlikely that the Syrian government would request such aid from the 
United States as part of a peace agreement, especially considering Syrian Foreign 
Minister Farouk al-Shara's claim that Syria has not requested any aid. 76 
Despite the claims of the Syrian Foreign Minister, the Tel Aviv daily Ha 'aretz 
reported that Israel would push for aid to Syria in the event of a peace agreement to 
preclude any economic instability on Israel's northern border. 77 U.S. law title 22 Section 
3405 provides for the establishment of a fund to underwrite the costs of the Middle East 
peace process. The law also encourages foreign investment in those countries that 
participate in the process. 78 To this end, the European Union has substantially increased 
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http://www.mcmri.orgisd/SP6900.html accessed I February 2000. 
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its level of participation in the region. Britain has supported the Palestinian Authority 
through training branches of its government, and with the European Union, has provided 
nearly $2 billion in aid. British influence, coupled with the British authorship of U.N. 
Resolution 242 should make the E.U. a suitable choice as the supplier of aid to Syria.79 
The Syrian military will expect their fair share in any agreement. As was the case 
with all other signatories to accords with Israel, incoming aid will procure new military 
equipment. Syria would most likely balk at any agreement that placed limits or 
conditions on military purchases. If the senior partner does not get anything, nobody 
does. 
1. Israeli Security Demands 
The basic issue of an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement is the return of the Golan 
Heights to Syria that Israel captured in the 1967 Six Day War. Negotiations in the past 
have broken down because of Syria's unwillingness to compromise its demands to return 
to the borders of 4 June 1967. Additionally, Israel has made 'security demands' such as 
retention of the Mt. Hermon listening post, and troop deployments part of any agreement 
with Syria to return the Golan. 
Ghassan Bishara quotes a recently published interview from 1976 with the former 
Israeli Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, that security issues had nothing to do with 
countries to support peace in the Middle East. Available [Online]: http://law2.housc.gov/usc.htmaccessed 
24 July 2000. 
79 Robin Cook, "Speech by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook at Reception Marking the 501h 
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Israel's capture of the Golan Heights in 1967. It was a simple matter of land greed. 80 
Given the wide dissemination of this interview in Syria and the Middle East, i: seems 
unlikely that Syria would allow the retention of the Mt. Hermon post or dictation of its 
troop placements as part of any deal. If security had nothing to do with the Golan's 
appropriation, then it should have nothing to do with its return. 
This arrl other demands that have the appearance of a concession would weaken 
the strength of President Bashar a~ Asad. Any inside contender for power would be able 
to point to a concession as a sign of weakness and incompetence of the presidency. In his 
first aldress to the Syrian People's Assembly as President of the Republic, Bashar a~ 
Asad underscored this point by taking a very hard stand: 
They [Israel] tell us: Take 95 percent of the land. When we ask about 
the remaining 5 percent, they say: it is not a big deal. Few meters should not be 
an obstacle to peace, then why don't they return the 4 June line and give us the 5 
percent ofthe western side of Lake Tiberias?8I 
Due to the relative vulnerability of the new President, he must take the same 
position as that of his father or he will invite his removal by a potential contender. 
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III. SUNNI URBAN BUSINESS CLASS 
A series of events that drained Syria of its financial resources resulted in the 
Sunni urban business class's incorporation into the authoritarian bargain of Syria. The 
loss of external cash aid from the Arab oil states, and the subsequent withdrawal and 
collapse of Syria's super-power patron, the Soviet Union, strengthened the elite ties 
between the 'Alawi military and Sunni urban business class. 
As the relationship between the 'Alawi military elite and urban business class 
developed, Syrian foreign policy towards Israel moved from belligerence to 
reconciliation. The simultaneous rise of the business class and the moderation of foreign 
policy suggest the two are strongly correlated. This tum of events is not an argument that 
peace is good for business. Rather, it is an argument that good business is required to 
protect the Syrian regime in the peace. 
A. PARTNERSHIP WITH THE 'ALA WI MILITARYELITE 
Sectarian violence begun by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976 eventually grew to 
near civil war proportions by 1980. The Brotherhood rebelled against the secular nature 
of the regime that was led by kuffar, rejecters of the faith, namely the 'Alawi. Following 
a string of assassinations and bombings against 'Alawi military personnel and Ba'th 
officials, the insurrection reached its peak in 1982 when the Muslim Brotherhood took 
control of the city of Hama. The Syrian security forces battled with the Sunni 
fundamentalists for nearly three weeks in February leveling the city but also effectively 
putting an end to the opposition. 
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It was during this struggle however, that a new relationship was born. The Sunni 
business class of Damascus stood by the 'Alawi regime and did not support the Muslim 
Brotherhood led uprising. 82 The Sunni businessmen who supported the uprising were 
generally small- scale manufacturers and traders, while the urban business class 
represented entrepreneurs with more capital and more ambitious desires. 83 These 
businessmen were represented by Badr ad-Din Shallah, who would later lead the 
Damascus Chamber of Commerce and become one of the most influential businessmen in 
Syria. 84 The Syrian regime showed its approval by lifting restrictions on private sector 
limitations in agriculture and joint public and private companies. 85 
Coincidentally, the emergence of the Sunni business class partnership with the 
'Alawi led regime occurred in the same year as did the last heavy military engagements 
between Israel and Syria. While more limited. in scope compared to the earlier Arab-
Israeli wars, the Syrian and Israeli conflict in Lebanon, begun in June of 1982, included 
large-scale air and land battles. 
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Syria remained firm for two reasons. First, the regime was fighting for survival in 
Lebanon. If the Israeli Defense Forces drove Syrian forces from Lebanon, the Asad 
regime would have been significantly shaken due to its recent internal challenge. 
Secondly, Syria viewed Lebanon as an attractive source of capital since the 
beginning of its intervention. Since the mid 1970's, private firms in Syria drew heavily 
on the Syrian state run commercial bank, and Beirut's large financial institutions had 
provided a significant alternative for Syrian developers. 86 Chaos in Lebanon, either from 
civil war or an Israeli invasion was bad for Syrian business. By protecting and fighting 
for these financial assets, the regime exhibited real commitment to its private business 
interests. So long as Israel threatened these resources, Syria would be expected to defend 
them. 
B. POLITICAL ECONOMY UNDER THE ASAD FAMILY 
Foil owing the Ba 'thist takeover in 1963, Syria nationalized nearly its entire 
economy to make it accord with its socialist ideology. This trend slowed following the 
takeover by Hafiz al-Asad in 1970, because he changed the Syrian economy by 
transitioning it from a purely socialist one to a form of state run capitalism. From the 
beginning of his tenure in office, Hafiz al-Asad sought to re-integrate the entrepreneurial 
businessmen of the Syrian merchant class. The earlier Ba'th government's moves toward 
86 Fred Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, Thirty Years of Confrontation, {Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), 94-95. 
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complete socialization of the Syrian economy had disaffected this stratum of Syrian 
society. 
With the influx of Arab aid following the 1973 October War, the government 
embarked on a wide range of development while assigning a limited role to the private 
sector in less capital intensive ventures such as light construction, trade, and services. 87 
Over time, this alliance between the regime and the merchant class grew as the Syrian 
economy offered some limited opportunity to the private sector. The reform programs 
called for state-led growth that allowed for some private sector involvement, which was 
consistent with the government's officially stated policy to broaden the social basis of the 
regime. During what Volker Perthes calls Syria's first infitah or economic liberalization, 
the economic incentives being offered to the public sector came from increased domestic 
oil revenues and Arab aid from the Persian Gulf. Because of these reforms, the urban-
merchant classes living standards improved significantly. 
1. Soviet Union Military and Economic Aid 
The Soviet Union played an important role in the economic development and 
sustainment of Syria under the al-Asad regime. The most significant impact the Soviet 
Union had on the Syrian economy was relieving it of the financial burden of building its 
military. 
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Between 1974 and 1983, Soviet military deliveries to Syria amounted to nearly 
$3.2 billion (in 1984 dollars). 88 These deliveries were on a "concessionary-loan 
basis .. .In general, therefore these imports did not burden Syria's foreign exchange 
balance or budgets.'>89 By 1985, the Soviet Union began to charge Syria for its military 
imports, by subtracting the trade balance of Syrian imports to the Soviet Union. In effect, 
with the Soviet Union's ultimate collapse and Syria's unwillingness to re-pay Russia 
what it owed, Syria's military buildup, and development was essentially free. 90 
Beginning in 1985, Soviet military aid shipments dropped from $2.4 billion per 
year to $1.3 billion.91 By 1987, Soviet military equipment could only be purchased at 
cost, resulting in a drastic reduction in weapon deliveries. Syria's debt to Russia soared 
to $10- $12 billion and Syria is now delaying payment of its debt by hesitating to 
recognize Russia as the legal successor to the former Soviet Union. 92 
Soviet aid to Syria, while mainly in the form of military equipment, also included 
economic aid. Though less economic aid flowed to Syria than other Soviet allies in the 
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region, Syria was able to rely on a steady flow of $35 million in economic aid until 
1985.93 The Syrian market also profited from its relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Through state controls, goods, were exported to the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
markets. This trade was estimated to average $200 to $300 million a year. Syrian state 
run companies provided moderate quality goods at premium prices, which generated 
higher profits than could be expected on the open market. By the end of the 1980's 
however, trade between Syria and the formerly communist world ceased. 94 
2. Oil Money 
Beginning with the October war of 1973, Syria began to receive large cash 
payments from the Arab oil states cloaked as support for the war with Israel. In the five 
years following the 1973 war, Syria received $600 million per year in official Arab aid. 
With the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David accords, the oil states pledged 
$1.8 billion annually to Syria for ten years for maintaining its state of war with Israel. As 
the world market's oil prices began to fall and for political reasons as well, this aid began 
to dwindle by the mid 1980's. 
Decreasing aid to Syria from Persian Gulf countries in the mid-1980's was also 
politically motivated because Syria supported non-Arab Iran in its war with Iraq. Arab 
aid was somewhat replaced by tan, which offered free petroleum shipments valued 
93 Ofer and Pelzman, 228. 
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between $300 and $800 million annually between 1982-1986. This aid began to decrease 
to as little as $50 million, and by 1990 the aid ceased. 95 
Syria benefited in other ways from the oil boom of the 1970's and early 1980's. 
Besides the direct cash grants provided by Arab oil states, remittances from nearly 
500,000 Syrians working throughout the Middle East provided the economy with a cash 
infusion. Cash flows estimated as high as $900 million in 1979 to a low of $327 million 
in 1985 streamed into the Syrian economy. 96 
3. Economic Crisis 
By 1985, financial support to Syria from both the Soviet Union and the oil states 
had begun to erode, but the signs of economic trouble were recognized four years earlier. 
Beginning in 1981, Hafiz al-Asad launched economic austerity programs to promote 
economic self-reliance and to ease the financial burden on the state run economy. The 
aims of these measures were to reduce state expenditures and services because, as Syria's 
leadership explained, the population had been consuming more than it was producing. 
By 1985, the government stopped hiring new employees and by 1988 began to reduce 
government subsidies for agriculture, industry, as well as consumers.97 
The Syrian economy's biggest problem was in foreign exchange and by 1986, this 
problem took the highest priority. The Syrian economy was designed to produce import 
95 Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, (London and New York: l.B. 
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substitutions, but now, Syria needed to reverse course and export its products. The 
export of oil and other raw materials became a top priority because of their value on the 
world market. Syria was to export finished products any cost. In some cases, price 
dumping was encouraged. Products not exported were sold in the local markets. 98 
As Arab aid to Syria ended, re-payments on loans from western financial sources 
and international monetary programs came due resulting in debt payments exceeding 
incoming payments. These factors combined with the economic mismanagement of the 
Syrian economy provided the ingredients for an economic collapse. 
By 1981, external cash flows that had supported the Syrian regime equaled 12.7 
percent of the GNP not including $900 million in remittances from abroad. By 1985, this 
influx of capital ceased. The Syrian economy grew at 1 percent per year between 1982 
and 1985 while the population increased by 3.4 percent per year. 99 
The regime reacted by easing restrictions on private sector finance exports from 
foreign held capital and adjusting official exchange rates. These measures relped slow 
Syria's failing economy but inadvertently caused shortages in commodities. By 1986, 
Syria's foreign exchange reserves fell to $327 million, which were less than a month's 
imports. The government's central planning mechanisms were too limited t> deal with 
98 Ibid., 48. 
99 Nabil Sukkar, "The Crisis of 1986" in Eberhard Kienle (ed.) Contemporary Syria, 
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the crisis and relied on borrowing which resulted in inflation as high as 60 percent in 
1987.100 
Following various proposed solutions, the Syrian government's economic reforms 
focused on the expansion of the private sector, liberalizing prices, reducing subsidies, and 
developing an export-orientated strategy. The policy's effect was a meager increase in 
the GDP of 4 percent per year between 1986 and 1991, just slightly more than its 
population growth.IOI 
C. INCLUSION OF THE SUNNI URBAN BUSINESS CLASS 
Because of the financial crisis in the 1980's, the relationship between the 'Alawi 
military elite and urban Sunni business class grew stronger. Losing financial rents from 
Arab oil aid, and Soviet and communist bloc subsidies caused a foreign exchange crisis 
by 1986. "State revenues were running short and external sources were not forthcoming 
in amounts that could cover the government's investment commitment."i02 By 1988, the 
World Bank stopped financing Syrian developmental projects when loans from that 
institution topped $210 million. 103 
New regulations sought to generate foreign exchange. To mobilize private capital 
for productive investments, Syria repealed Socialist reforms against large land holdings. 
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Acceptance of the industrial sector's privatization was mixed. I 04 The government would 
open new sectors of the economy for private enterprise in goods formerly banned from 
importation. This was a risky venture for private businessmen however, because the list 
of goods that could be privately manufactured or were banned from importation could 
change from year to year. I 05 
Syria had to relieve itself of the financial burden of an extended public sector. 
Generally, the shock to the economy exacted by losing external aid and deteriorating 
levels of trade make government subsidization of state owned enterprises (SOE) 
exceedingly costly and difficult. If the government has firm control over its citizenry, it 
would be able to reform state owned enterprises. If the groups that are disadvantaged in 
SOE reform ere not relevant to the government's support, then reform is easier to 
undertake.I06 For example, during the same period, Egypt's state owned enterprises 
employed about 14 percent of the population, and total public sector employment about 
40 percent. The ~neral Confederation of Labor in Egypt, which included most SOE 
unions, exercised de facto veto control over the government's efforts to implement 
reform.I07 In Syria's case, however, the regime attempted SOE reform to strengthen the 
Sunni business class, \\hich would relieve the state of some of the public burden. This 
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caused some alienation in the public sector. A report circulated by the General 
Federation of Workers' Unions of Syria accused government officials of supporting 
policies that would diminish the demand for products produced by the state owned 
enterprises in the public sector.108 They were right. 
Turning to the Sunni business class, the regime initiated a series of reforms. It 
created joint ventures between the state and the private sector with the private sector 
contributing not more than 75 percent of the capital. Money was invested in agriculture, 
food industries, and tourism.109 
The change in tone in internal politics by official media and the acceptance of the 
new business class is noteworthy. Volker Perthes states that before the late 1980's, the 
business class had been commonly referred to as parasitic bourgeoisie. In 1988 
however, state media sources began using the term "businessman" frajul a 'mal) in a 
positive tone. The government a:msulted successful businessmen on economic policies, 
which led to a truly pluralistic debate on internal economic issues.110 Influential 
members of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, a long neglected institution, were 
appointed to key governmental positions. Some of the richer urban merchants staffed the 
Committee for the Guidance of Import, Export, and Consumption, which enabled them to 
voice their opinions to the highest levels of the government administration. 
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D. TIES TO THE 'ALA WI MILITARY ELITE 
In recent years, members of the Syrian authoritarian bargain significantly 
strengthened their ties. This recent period's most striking feature is the transition toward 
economic liberalization and integration of the 'Alawi military and Sunni business class 
and the formal inclusion and participation of Syria in the Middle East peace process. 
Marriages between ranking members of the military and Sunni business classes solidified 
this emergent relationship. Children from 'Alawi military and Sunni merchant families 
marry and move into the business world and this younger generation is often the most 
vocal about greater economic liberalization. Intermarriage between the 'Alawi military 
and Sunni business class have served the domestic interests of both groups. For the 
'Alawi it provides a broader base of support and diminishes the appearance of a 
monolithic 'Alawi controlled regime. For the Sunnis, a marriage into the 'Alawi elite 
provides political connections that can further their business interests. Ill For example, 
Rifat al-Asad, the late President's brother, has four wives, two of whom, Lina al-Khayyir, 
and Raja Barakat, are from the landed wealthy and Damascene upper middle class 
respectively. 112 Political connections with the Syrian regime helped make Mustafa al-
Ill Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Asad's Syria and the New World Order: The Struggle for Regime 
Survival" in Middle East Policy, vol. II, Number 1, Middle East Policy Council, 1993,11. 
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Aidi, a Sunni businessman, a tycoon who made his fortune on airplane deals with Syrian 
Arab Airlines and the Al-Sham hotel chain.Il3 
1. Empowerment of the Sunni Urban Business Class 
Syrian Law 10, of May 1991, further included the private sectors in the economy. 
Certain industries would no longer be protected or others banned; the new law opened up 
virtually the entire industrial sector to private entrepreneurs. Approved industrial projects 
received a seven-year tax holiday, with invested capital and profits being widely exempt 
from any restrictions or customs tariffs.II4 While the law reflected a significant move 
towards economic liberalization, the legislation was clearly focused on the upper 
echelons of the business class who could raise the required 10 million LS ($240,000) to 
be included in the legislation. liS Additionally, the legislation allowed capital held abroad 
to be used for investment projects in Syria. The estimated offshore holdings by Syrians in 
1994 was $26.1 billion, which was 160 percent of Syria's GNP)I6 Furthermore, the law 
facilitated the flow of capital between Beirut and Damascus, which had recently signed 
the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination in the same year. The net 
effect of the treaty transformed Lebanon into a virtual satellite of Syria. 
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It is ironic to note that the government introduced Syrian Law 10 of 1991 at a 
period when the Syrian economy was doing so well. Rather than a reaction to an 
economic downturn like the financial crisis of the 1980's, the law seems to have been 
enacted to protect the economy from one. It can only be surmised that the regime, having 
seen both economic good times and bad, wanted to take timely advantage of Syria's 
unique economic position. Another explanation is that after tre second Gulf War, the 
United States began fulfilling its promise to restart the Middle East peace process. If the 
peace process were to result in treaties between the Arab states and Israel, the potential 
for a dominant Israeli economy dwarfing those of its neighbors could threaten the 'Alawi 
regime. 
By 1995, the Syrian economy began to slow again. Syria's oil industry was a 
harbinger of hard times. In 1995, Syrian oil revenues generated 60 percent of the 
nation's export earnings ($2.4 billion), but according to the Shell Oil Company, " .. .if no 
significant oil discoveries are made in the next few years, Syria would become a net oil 
importer by the year 2005."117 Another indicator of Syria's down turning economy was 
the current account balance, which has mown progressively worse deficits surpassing 
$600 million. liS In 1995, AlBa 'th openly called for more economic reform. Under the 
headline, "THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE STILL NEEDS MORE," the newspaper 
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argued that one investment law alone could not reinvigorate the economy and the 
progress in reforming tax laws and customs duties were insufficient. 119 
2. Political Growth of the Sunni Urban Business Class 
In 1990, the Syrian parliament (Majlis al-Sha'b) expanded from 195 to 250 seats 
to allow non-Ba'thist participants to control roughly one third of the legislative body. 
The National Front, an organization for the Ba'th party and its allies held 168 seats with 
82 going to independents. "Voters had little choice for the National Front candidates, but 
could choose from among 9000 independent candidates nationwide."120 Respected urban 
upper-middle class professionals and members of the new commercial bourgeoisie were 
among the dominant independent winners.121 
In Syria's internal politics, the movement towards more economic liberalization is 
paramount. In March of this year, Hafiz al-Asad accepted the resignation of his long-
standing Prime Minister Mahmud al-Zu'bi and appointed Dr. Muhammad Mustafa Miru 
to the post with the task of forming a new government. The Syrian government's press 
releases praised Miru as the 'man with clean hands' with exceptional administrative and 
scientific credentials. Miru is the first Syrian Prime Minister appointed to the post who 
was not a member of the Ba'th Regional Command before taking the office. Moreover, 
119 Ali' Abbud, "The Investment Climate Needs More" (excerpt) Damascus, AI Ba'th in Arabic, 
(27 December 1995) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report- Near 
East Southwest Asia, 16 February 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- NES 96-033, p. 52). 
120 Ayubi, 423. 
121 Volker Perthes, "Syria's Parliamentary Elections, Remodeling Asad's Political Base." Middle 
East Report (MERIP) (January-February 1992), 17. 
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Miru's former position was the provincial governor of Aleppo, a region that has 
witnessed substantial industrial growth during his tenure there. No former prime minister 
has made the jump from regional governor to the top ministerial position. Miru' s 
promotion reflects the Sunni urban business class's success in their desire for 
representation in govemrnent.122 Miru faces daunting challenges however. Foremost 
among them are new economic reforms.I23 Economic issues took center stage as the 
press reports flowed in from Damascus. The news was not about the peace process, but 
on the new government makeup that would improve Syria's economy. Postings that 
ensured regime security such as defense and interior went unchanged, but others v.ere 
not.I24 The official Syrian daily AI Ba 'th called the new cabinet makeup a sign of hope. 
Members remaining in their positions had proven themselves capable enough, and the 
new cabinet introduced "new experts" capable of raising the economy from stagnation to 
122 Subhi Hadidi, "Has Al-Asad Lost Confidence in the Team That Has Been Ruling With Him 
for 31 Years? The Cabinet ofMustafa Miru Signifies the fall of the Traditions of the Corrective 
Movement." (text) London AI Ouds AI-'Arabi in Arabic (10 March 2000) Translation by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Reoort- Near East West Europe 10 March 2000 (PrEx. 7.10: 
FBIS GMP 200003110001 07). 
123 Unattributed, "High Level Sources on Tasks Facing New Syrian Cabinet" (text) London AI 
Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic (10 March 2000) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
FBIS Daily Report- Near East South Asia 10 March 2000 (PrEx. 7.10: FBIS NES- GMP 
2000031 0000089). 
124 Ibrahim Humaydi, "Damascus: New Government Launches 'Cycle of Change." (text) 
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progress.I25 This latest change may portend greater economic liberalization that will 
further enhance the Sunni business class's power. 
E. URBAN BUSINESS CLASS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
This chapter addressed the Syrian regimes' ties with the Sunni urban business 
class. In a quid pro quo arrangement stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood uprising, 
the business elite supported the Asad family. In return, those business leaders secured 
connections through personal contacts or marriage that they used to enhance their 
entrepreneurial standing. This "partner to the regime" gained political power and status. 
A question arises, however: How does foreign policy affect the interests of this emergent 
relationship? 
From the perspective of foreign policy, the urban business class, as Sunni Arabs, 
would want to remain in the Arab camp. Sunni Arabs want to retain regional ties to the 
Arab states of Saudi Arabia and Egypt because it is in their best interest to do so. They 
would not tolerate a political alliance with Iran, as it did in Iran's war with Arab Iraq, 
again. When the regime decided to side with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, the political elite's 
composition was very different than it is today. Syria had not experienced the Muslim 
Brotherhood uprising in Hama. It was a singularly praetorian regime with the military as 
the leadership's core support group. The support received from the Sunni urban business 
class during the Muslim Brotherhood uprising and this group's later economic 
125 Unattributed, The New Government: Hopes and Responsibilities" (text) Damascus, Damascus 
Al Ba'th in Arabic, (15 March 2000) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS 
Daily Report- Near East Southwest Asia 15 March 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS- NES GMP 
20000315000069). 
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involvement in the state, altered the nature of the regime. It changed from a purely 
praetorian focus to a praetorian-corporatist elite that elevated the business class to a 
junior partnership level. 
Certainly in the past ten years, Syria is a state closely allied with the other 
member states of the Arab League, foregoing sectarian differences and instead, 
emphasizing the arrangement's Arab dimension. Ties between Syria and her Arab 
neighbors have markedly strengthened in both extent and cordiality. 
1. Domestic Steps Toward Peace 
Foreign policy for Syria centers on two key interests: Lebanon and the Middle 
East Peace Process. The urban business class may not like Israel and may fear its 
military strength, but it should realize a peace accord's benefits. The regime geared itself 
toward economic liberalization. Law 10 of 1991, for example, held that capital held 
abroad is available to make investments in Syria. This legislation, the relaxing of others 
such as tariffs, and the development of an Arab Free Trade Zone are preparatory steps 
toward a peace settlement. Hailed as a great improvement in economic law, Law 10, 
however, was certainly not full- fledged liberalization. Recently however, improvements 
have been made. In May of 2000, the government enacted amendments to Law 10 
allowing foreign nationals to own or rent property and real estate in Syria for investment 
projects, which were covered under the law. In another improvement, the amendments 
allowed foreign nationals to use Syrian currency purchased in foreign markets for 
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investments in Syria. This amendment removed the requirement to do so in Syria at the 
'official' exchange rate, which obviated investors taking a significant financialloss.126 
More reforms are necessary, especially those that will affect the Syrian banking 
system. Dr. Nabil Sukkar, a Syrian economist, recommended overhauling the state's 
monetary policy (the official exchange rate), making the central bank independent, and 
developing the infrastructure necessary to allow it to make small business loans to benefit 
the Syrian economy.127 
The political and economic influence of the Sunni Arab urban business class will 
undoubtedly continue to grow in the present environment. These changes enhanced the 
capabilities of the junior partner to contribute to the economic health of the regime, a fact 
highlighted by the new government instituted in the past year and the efforts at further 
economic liberalization. 
126 Abd al-Faatah al-Awd, "Report on an Interview with Syrian Economy and Foreign Trade 
Minister Dr. Muhammad al-lmadi" (text) Damascus Tishrin in Arabic, (16 May 2000). Translation by the 
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IV. CASE STUDY- SYRIAN PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION 
DESERT STORM 
The need to further the interests of its domestic elites and realign its external 
threats motivated Syria's support of the U.S.-led Gulf War coalition. 
David's omnibalancing argument holds that a leader must be able to balance 
internal and external threats to the regime to survive.I28 The external physical threats 
faced by Syria in the summer of 1990 were minimal. Though Iraq and Syria share a long 
contiguous border, the idea that Saddam Hussein would use his forces to conquer such a 
destitute state as Syria is improbable. There was no imminent danger along Syria's 
remaining borders with Turkey and Jordan. The threats to the regime were from its own 
elite internally, and from Israel externally. The state had to ensure the continued backing 
of its main pillar groups, the 'Alawi military elite and urban business class, or face their 
loss of support and possibly its removal from power. Following the 1986 financial crisis, 
the Asad regime, had realized the optimum form of support it needed. The strong 
security forces remained loyal to the leadership so long as the regime provided it 
patronage in return for its security. The Sunni Arab business elite diversified the 
regime's ethnic face and provided a source of foreign exchange and economic 
productivity in return for an economic free reign. Syria had to address its worsening 
economic conditions to maintain this balance. 
128 David, 7. 
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The Gulf War would mark the final withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the 
Middle East. The Asad regime had witnessed a weakening Soviet presence since the mid 
1980's, but the lack of Soviet support for Iraq would epitomize its weakness in the 
region. 
A. CONTEXT 
On the eve of the Second Gulf War, Syria neared economic ruination. It had lost 
almost all external rents and could not pay its debts. Servicing these payments in 1989 
surpassed incoming cash flows.I29 Military expenditures and imports were half that of 
1980 and the Soviet Union had withdrawn its influence and support from the region. 
In reaching the decision to side with the United States, the Asad regime had to 
weigh two important factors: the will of public opinion, and strategic needs and interests 
of the state. The regime would ultimately forego both because in the end, carefully 
weighing these two factors would point to neutrality. 
Syria could just as easily have stayed neutral in the Second Gulf War, as did 
Jordan. The Syrian people were widely supportive of Saddam Hussein's invasion. They 
saw Iraq's move into Kuwait as a victory of the 'have-nots' over the 'haves.' 
Economically, the common Syrian identified more closely with Iraqis than with a 
common Kuwaiti who enjoyed the tremendous luxuries that Kuwaiti petrol-dollars 
wrought. Following the invasion, Syrian supporters of Iraq clashed with government 
troops in small towns and the Agence France-Presse reported Syrian troops in the capitol 
129 Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad (London: LB. Taurus, 1995), 34. 
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of Damascus to prevent pro-Iraqi demonstrations. 130 In the Syrian mosques, Muslim 
'ulama prayed for the success of the Iraqi forces. In the military, three Syrian 
commanders turned down promotion opportunities so as not to be too closely associated 
with the regime's pro U.S. policy. Foreign diplomats estimated that Syrian public 
opinion ran as high as 90 percent in favor of Iraq.l31 
This level of support was certainly evident in Jordan where the majority 
Palestinian population voiced tremendous support of Saddam Hussein's invasion. A 
demonstration held in Amman at the conclusion of the ground war in Iraq saw 10,000 
supporters of Saddam Hussein take to the streets in opposition to the U.S. led 
coalition. 132 This level of support forced King Hussein of Jordan to press for a 
negotiated Arab solution to the crisis, which was based on his state's neutrality in the 
conflict. 
While Syria and Iraq, led by separate factions of the Ba'th party, had been at 
ideological odds in the past, these nations certainly had no direct conflicts. Even during 
the Iran-Iraq War, Syria had sided with Iran to punish Saddam Hussein for wasting what 
130 Unattributed, "Troops Surround Cities after Pro-Iraqi Protests," (text) Paris AFP in English 
(29 August 1990) Transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report- Near East 
Southwest Asia 30 August 1990 (PrEx 7.10- NES 90-169, NC29081711990). 
131 Daniel Pipes, "Damascus Courts the West: Syrian Politics, 1989-1991" The Washington 
Institute Policy Papers. (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), 51-53. 
132 Sirin Halasa, "10,000 Demonstrate in Solidarity with Iraq," (text) Amman, Jordan Times in 
English (1 March 1991) Transcribed by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report- Near 
East Southwest Asia. I March 1991 (PrEx. 7.10- NES 91-041, JNOI0391191). 
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Hafiz al-Asad termed 'Arab resources' on Iran instead of Israel. 133 Asad's support for 
Iran was political, not physical in that no Syrian troops opened a second front along the 
Iraqi border. However, Syria's support for non-Arab Iran did cost Syria tremendous 
political and monetary capital vis-a-vis the Arab states of the region. Strategically, 
Syria's border with Iraq was a lesser concern, when compared to its antagonistic 
relationships with Israel and Turkey. Syrian support for the U.S. led coalition could have 
been limited to the political support it had shown Iran when Iraq had invaded that country 
in 1980. The conditions were extremely similar. Iraq had invaded and was thus 
'wasting' Arab resources in a conflict that should be reserved for the struggle with Israel. 
Instead, Syria dispatched an entire armored division totaling 20,000 troops and 
equipment to Saudi Arabia.134 
As the United States set out building its coalition, it was inevitable that Syria join 
the coalition. Then U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker believed that adding Syria to 
the U.S. led coalition would "immeasurably strengthen" the credibility of the coalition. 135 
According to Daniel Pipes, Asad requested quid-pro-quo for his inclusion in the coalition. 
Pipes believes that Asad asked to remove Syria from the U.S. listing of states sponsoring 
terrorism (which automatically subjected Syria to economic sanctions), and financial aid. 
133 Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Middle East Peace Process, (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 59. 
134 Andrew Leyden, Gulf War Debriefing Book, An After Action Report (Grants Pass, OR: 
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"I am your cover" Asad reportedly told a U.S. delegation, though this argument has not 
been realized.136 
The Asad regime's decision to side with the United States against Iraq neither 
followed the political will of its people, nor did it follow a strategic need of the state by 
confronting its neighbor. 
B. REALIGNMENT VERSUS EXTERNAL THREATS 
The Soviet Union's withdrawal from the Middle East presented a confusing 
dilemma for tre Soviet's two main client states, Syria and Iraq. Syria realized that with 
Soviet support it could retain a stalemate with Israel. It had been re-supplied following 
its major confrontations with Israel with new and better equipment in 1983. By the late 
1980's however, this equipment was harder to obtain, and the regime would have sensed 
the growing reluctance of the Soviets to be involved in a conflict between its client state 
and an Israel backed by the United States. 
Iraq however, had regularly received weapons and support from the Soviet Union 
in its war with Iran, and had felt no weakening of its ties to its major patron. Saddam 
Hussein may have been naive to the weakening Soviet position because of Iraq's ability 
to purchase weapons and provide the Soviets with a valuable source of foreign exchange, 
something Syria could not. 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Soviet Union allowed the United States a free 
hand in organizing its coalition to oust Saddam Hussein that would result in the U.S. led 
136 Pipes, 24. 
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Gulf War. With the United States taking the leadership role in the Middle East, the 
Syrian regime faced a situation similar to that of Anwar Sadat in the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War. In that war, an internal threat predicated Sadat's realignment from the Soviet Union 
to tre United States, when Israeli forces threatened to destroy the Egyptian jd Army 
trapped on the east bank of the Suez Canal. If the Israelis persisted and destroyed the 
Egyptian army, Sadat faced the threat of a military coup that would replace him. The 
tremendous loss that Israel threatened to deliver would nullify Sadat's political victory in 
recapturing the Suez Canal. Sadat required the help of the United States to restrain Israel 
to prevent his own demise from the internal threat of a military coup.I37 
While the situation faced by Asad in the summer of 1990 was certainly not as 
critical of that ofSadat in 1973, the principles were the same. Asad's alignment with the 
United States was a shift from the expected protection that the Soviets had heretofore 
exercised, but in light of its weakened position, was no longer capable. 
C. INTERVENTION ANDREW ARDS 
The Syrian decision to join with the United States and other Arab nations in 
coalition against Iraq would produce tremendous benefits to the regime. This alignment 
would provide legitimacy for Syria's intervention in Lebanon, and a cash infusion of 
rents and pledges from the Arab states and industrialized nations that would enable the 
regime to resume its clientalist relationship with its urban business class supporters. 
137 David, 87-88. 
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The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reversed the decline of world oil prices from the 
1980's. Before the invasion, oil prices hovered between $10-$15 a barrel. Following the 
invasion, the oil prices hovered between $20-$40 a barrei.138 While the United States 
took the lead in opposing the Iraqi aggression, economists began predicting that oil prices 
could reach as high as $80 or even $100 per barrel if war broke out.139 
Joining the U.S. led coalition, Hafiz al-Asad also sought to re-establish his 
support from the Arab oil states of the Persian Gulf. As one of the regime's prime 
financial supporters before the Iran-Iraq war, Asad realized the economic potential of 
coming to the threatened Gulf state's rescue. The projected rise in world oil prices 
brought back memories of the oil boom years and the wealth that they produced. Shortly 
after condemning the Iraqi regime's invasion of Kuwait, Syria received more than $2 
billion in direct aid.140 The Kuwaiti fund for Arab Economic Development has 
continued to provide annual payments in millions of dollars to fund large-scale 
infrastructure developments such as irrigation projects, and power plants.l41 
Gulf aid amounted to more than its original grant however. In March of 1991, 
Egypt, Syria, and the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council signed the Damascus 
138 Douglass McWilliams, "World Economy Wobbles: Impact of the Gulf War on the World 
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Declaration. The Declaration called for cooperation, non- interference in internal affairs 
and mutual respect. In return for a limited presence, Egypt and Syria would share $15 
billion annually. The GCC later reduced this amount to $6 billion. 142 Though the 
Declaration has since weakened to a multilateral forum for meetings between the 
signatories, the relationship with the Gulf States re-established the annual cash flows that 
had fostered Syrian growth during the oil boom years ofthe 1970's. 
International aid also flowed to Syria as a benefit of joining the U.S. led alliance. 
The aim of the United States was that nations who benefited from Iraq's expulsion from 
Kuwait should reimburse the nations who provided the manpower and military assets. To 
this end, Syria received an additional $200 million grant from the European Community 
and a $500 million loan from Japan. 
In sum, Asad's regime received an immediate cash inflow of nearly $3 billion in 
rettnn for stationing 20,000 troops in Saudi Arabia.143 Asad managed to use his military 
presence to the utmost. While Syrian troops did not engage in offensive operations, their 
mere presence in Saudi Arabia enabled Asad to reap tremendous financial benefits, and 
re-established cash flows from the Persian Gulf states. 
The massive influx of Arab financial support allowed the Syrian regime to 
complete infrastructure development that had languished since the mid-1980's. Volker 
Perthes states that similar to the aftermath of the 1973 October War, "Syrian officials 
142 Muhammad Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 86-88. 
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seemed to have problems coming up with project proposals for all the cash offered for 
development purposes from Gulf Arab and other sources."144 This infusion of strategic 
rents secured the regime the morey required to fund projects directed at the mixed and 
private sector companies, which would have their patronage expanded to the economy's 
industry and agricultural sectors. 
1. Military Benefits 
While the United States did not directly offer financial aid to Syria, it did give 
Syria a 'green light' to establish its hegemony over neighboring Lebanon.145 On 13 
October 1990, Syrian forces in Lebanon attacked the Presidential Palace of General 
Michel 'Awn in Beirut, while 20,000 Syrian troops stood shoulder to shoulder with the 
U.S. coalition in Saudi Arabia. Syrian forces ousted General 'Awn, who led Lebanese 
opposition to Syria's continued presence in his country. After 'Awn's expulsion, Syrian 
forces installed a pro-Syrian government in its stead. Syrian dominance in Lebanon was 
formalized on 22 May 1991, a month and a half following the cease-fire in Iraq. The 
Treaty of Fraternity, Cooperation, and Coordination stated that Lebanese policies be 
conducted in cooperation with Syria. 146 The United States did not interfere in the Syrian 
takeover of Lebanon, other than to restrain Israel, which may have preferred a Syrian 
144 Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad (London: LB. Taurus, 1995), 48. 
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imposed stability to Lebanese infighting. The day following the treaty signing, the U.S. 
government authorized the release of $4 million of non- lethal military equipment to 
Lebanon that had been impounded since the 1980s. 147 
The 30,000 Syrian troops stationed in Lebanon benefit from the Syrian hegemony 
there. Maintaining support from the Syrian military machine is one of the key objectives 
of the Asad regime. "Much of the smuggling that goes on in Lebanon can be explained 
as a means by which Damascus pays off ... some of the key Syrian military commanders 
who control smuggling routes in Lebanon."148 In addition to the legal benefits of its 
domination in Lebanon, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that Syrian 
control of the heroin and hashish trade in the Biqa Valley results in $1 billion a year for 
Syrian authorities.149 Fred Lawson states that profits and kickbacks for the military and 
security forces in control of the narcotics trade have been valued at nearly $2 billion a 
year.150 The Lebanese banking system lauders and distributes profits garnered through 
the drug trade. Powerful Syrians connected to these activities include Mustafa T'las, the 
Defense Minister of Syria, and Rifat al-Asad, brother of the late Syrian President. 151 
147 Pipes, 61. 
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The influx of renewed rents from the Arab oil states financed a modernization of 
the Syrian military equal to roughly $1-$2 billion.152 These massive rents enabled the 
Syrian armed forces to purchase arms from the formerly communist states of Eastern 
Europe as well as China and the Democratic People's Republic ofKorea.153 
2. Urban Business Class Benefits 
In May of 1991, Syria enacted Law 10, which allowed direct foreign investment 
into the Syrian economy and more private sector participation in the economy. Law 10 
hailed as a potential harbinger of further liberalization, served to take advantage of the 
changing political scene of the Middle East. The law's passage was partly due to the 
uncertainty of future rent transfers from the Gulf Arab oil states, which Syria had 
experienced in the middle of the 1980's. Following Iraq's invasion, approximately 
100,000 Syrian expatriates returned from Kuwait and brought their knowledge and 
business contacts with them. Moreover, they also had valuable capital held abroad.l54 
In Lebanon, this enabled entrepreneurs to build and acquire assets in Syria and 
vice-versa. As the Syrian economy grows, Syrian expatriates in Lebanon and Lebanese 
businessmen are "at the forefront of those eager to invest in Syria once such opportunities 
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arise."155 With virtual control over Lebanon and its open market economy, the Asad 
family regime can offer its own businessmen the opportunity to invest trere. The number 
of Syrian businesses operating in Lebanon has grown tremendously following the signing 
of the Syrian-Lebanese treaty and the passage of Law 10. The head of the Lebanese 
Bankers Association, As'ad Sawaya is a businessman from Horns and Syrim merchants 
head some of the largest road construction, contracting firms, and real estate 
developments in Lebanon. 156 Eliyahu Kanovsky reports that as many as a million 
Syrians work in Lebanon today, which reduces the unemployment in Syria. Additionally, 
the remittances sent home to families in Syria provide foreign exchange earnings 
estimated at $1 to $3 billion per year. 157 
3. Regime Benefits 
In joining the U.S. led coalition, Asad switched his external alignment from the 
Soviet Union to balance his internal threat from the 'Alawi military elite. For nearly 
twenty years, the Soviets had provided the Syrian military the super-power protection 
needed for a 'no peace, no war' stalemate. The Soviet Union removed this protection as 
it disengaged itself from the Middle East. The Syrian military would be alone to face its 
main rival, Israel. Given the increased cooperation between the United States and Israel 
155 Fidah Nisrallah, "Syria after Ta'if: Lebanon and the Lebanese in Syria" in Eberhard Kienle 
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and the predominant position of the United States in the region, any conflict between 
Israel and Syria would result in the destruction of the Syrian military. Similar to Sadat in 
1973, an angered military elite would seek Asad's removal for failing to protect them. In 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in eighteen days of fighting, Syria lost 1,150 tanks. Israel 
lost 200. The Soviet Union and the United States soon replaced the lost equipment. IS& In 
1990, Syria realized that neither the Soviet Union would be capable of providing similar 
support, nor would Syria be able to pay for it. The same was not true of Israel. The 
demise of the Soviet Union therefore removed Asad's shield and the regime had only two 
options. His first option was to remain neutral, which offered him no external protection 
of his armed forces and by extension, his own regime. His second option was to shift his 
external alignment to the United States, which would enable the United States to restrain 
Israel, much as Anwar Sadat had faced in 1973. Syria's acceptance of the 1991 Madrid 
Peace Conference and subsequent talks enabled this somewhat weak arrangement to 
persist, so long as Syria and Israel, under the guidance of the United States continue 
peace talks. 
D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The Syrian participation in the U.S. led Gulf War coalition enabled the regime to 
secure external sources of strategic rent to satisfy the interests of its domestic elites. The 
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Syrian military elite received an influx of new material, arms and supplies. More 
importantly, Syria's hegemony in Lebanon was secured and recognized, which provided 
a near constant source of patronage to the leadership of the 'Alawi led military and 
provided for its loyalty. Asad's alignment switch to the United States provided the 
'Alawi military elite the protection from Israel, which had heretofore been provided by 
the Soviet Union. This allows them the freedom to conduct their own activities in 
Lebanon and retains their loyalty to the Asad family regime. 
The flood of cash for supporting the U.S. position also provided the state with 
financing for new developmental projects. The mixed and private sector companies run 
by the regime supporters in the Sunni urban business class promptly received the new 
projects. Because of the new alignments, the state generated tremendous patronage for 
its domestic pillars of support. Other theoretical frameworks may explain Syria's 
decision-making, but the events highlighted in the case study are certainly consistent with 
the omnibalancing argument. 
Syria's next major foreign policy decision, barring some unforeseen crisis, will 
undoubtedly be whether to successfully conclude negotiations and a peace agreement 
over the Golan Heights with Israel. The status quo between Israel and Syria maintains 
the internal balance that the Asad family regime utilizes to maintain its rule. A peace 
agreement between Israel and Syria that would threaten this balance does not seem likely. 
The key to any possible arrangement must ensure that this internal political balance of the 
Syrian elite is retained. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analyzed the Syrian regime of the Asad family and identified the 
component members of the authoritarian bargain in the state. While it is obvious that 
both the 'Alawi military elite and Sunni urban business class are the regime's main 
backers, they also can be the cause of the regime's demise. The military could forcibly 
change the leadership, and the Sunni urban business class could withdraw its support, 
which could cause wider problems such as economic collapse, or confessional conflict. 
In this respect, the two groups are both supporters and threats to the regime. The regime 
must heed the elite's needs, or internal forces will change it. The Asad family is the face 
for the ruling interests, and the father's son continues a style of leadership that is familiar 
to the nation. 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
Four assumptions, implicit in this analysis of the role internal politics has upon 
Syrian foreign policy, will now be addressed. Those assumptions are: 
• The composition of the regime with Dr. Bashar al-Asad as president will 
remain intact. 
• Syria wants a final peace agreement with Israel. 
• The U.S. accepts the current regime of Bashar al-Asad and is willing to 
work with it. 
• Israel will work towards a peace agreement with Syria. 
The first assumption is that the composition of the regime with Dr. Bashar al-
Asad as president will remain intact. There has been no mention of internal disruption or 
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significant violence in the past year to suggest a power struggle or other inter-elite 
conflict will erupt and remove Bashar al-Asad from the presidency. There is, however, a 
possibility that an assassin's 'lucky bullet' could alter the status quo. In addition, there 
are a number of 'retired' military and security officials such as 'Ali Haydar and Ali Duba, 
who may give the regime trouble, but as the current regime solidifies, it will strengthen 
with each passing day. The second assumption is that Syria wants a final peace 
agreement with Israel. Politically, less flexibility in any agreement would be more 
beneficial to the regime, but harder, if not impossible to achieve. Such an agreement 
would bolster the prestige and security of President Asad. Likewise, a degrading 
agreement that succumbs to Israeli demands could be disruptive to the regime. A less 
than desirable agreement would provide an opportunity for a potential rival to seriously 
challenge the president on the pretense of selling out his nation and remove him from his 
post. 
Maintaining the status quo would not be particularly troublesome for the regime. 
The military would be under no pressure to withdraw from Lebanon, and the Sunni urban 
business class would still profit from their close ties to the regime. The occasional low-
level as well as ministerial talks between Syria and Israel maintain Syria's participation 
in the peace process and Syria's 'alignment' with the United States. 
The first assumption concerning the United States is that it accepts the current 
regime of Bashar al-Asad and is willing to work with it. This is most likely the case 
given the history of direct talks between U.S. President William J. Clinton and the late 
president Hafiz al-Asad. While likely to continue, the United States will have a newly 
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elected president in January of 2001. Historically, U.S. foreign policy for the United 
States has not been an important issue in a U.S. president's first term. Additionally, 
domestic interests in the United States could pressure a new president to forego 
conducting diplomatic negotiations with a state that has such an authoritarian nature. As 
corrupt and authoritarian as the regime may be, its composition and interests are known. 
A change in regime leadership would still require the current constituency of the 'Alawi 
military elite and Sunni urban business class. A defection by one of the two groups could 
have a potentially destabilizing effect and raise the specter of internal conflict. If the 
United States wants to maintain stability in the region, it should maintain its relationship 
with the Asad government. 
The last assumption is that Israel will work towards a peace agreement with Syria. 
Any agreement between the two nations will require the return of land by Israel to Syria. 
Recent negotiations have faltered over the question of a few meters of land around Lake 
Tiberias. This may call into question the sincerity of either negotiating side, but also 
highlights how contentious an issue a peace agreement for both Israel and Syria actually 
is. The maintenance of the status quo would be politically easier for Israel, than 
achieving a final peace agreement with Syria. 
B. OMNIBALANCING THE ELITE STRUCTURE OF POWER 
The Asad family regime must take into account the interests of the elite, and 
further these interests in both its domestic and foreign policy. 
The 'Alawi military elite is the main pillar of support for the regime. They serve 
as the Asad family's praetorian guard and enjoy a privileged position within the 
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authoritarian bargain. As witnessed by the recent ascension to power of Bashar al-Asad, 
it was Mustafa T'las, Minister of Defense, who orchestrated the transfer of the presidency 
from father to son. Under the Asad family, the 'Alawi military elite have maintained a 
comfortable status quo situation that was unchanged by the death of Hafiz al-Asad. 
Through either ethnic or familial ties, changes inside the 'Alawi military elite have 
strengthened the military's leadership and its relationship to the regime, thus ensuring 
that the Asad family would remain the titular head of the state. 
The military's position in Lebanon has been the source of neither debate nor 
friction inside of Syria, and its role in Lebanon will remain well into the future. As 
maintainers of the status quo, the military elite will not want either their position in the 
regime or in Lebanon altered. 
The Sunni urban business class is the rising force in Syrian politics. In the fifteen 
years since their inclusion into the authoritarian bargain, this group has seen their power 
enhanced through economic and political means. Their situation is different from that of 
the 'Alawi military in that it is a quid pro quo relationship with the regime. The Sunni 
urban business class' commerce provides needed foreign exchange and a face of diverse 
support for the regime. In return, the regime provides it with privileged business 
connections to state contracts and monopolistic enterprises. Economically, liberalization 
policies strengthened the Sunni urban business class. However slight this liberalizing 
trend has been, the business elite have taken full advantage ofthe reforms. Politically, the 
regime has enhanced the Sunni business class through its representation in the People's 
Assembly. Realistically, the legislature is pro forma, but at the same time, the regime has 
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allowed honest discussion on economic matters. The status quo for the Sunni urban 
business class is most probably adequate however, this group would benefit from ending 
Syria's perimeter status in the region. 
Since the U.S. led Gulf War coalition that ousted Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the 
Syrian regime has deftly protected itself from the strongest member of the authoritarian 
bargain, the 'Alawi military elite. By supporting the United States and entering into the 
Middle East peace process, the regime has protected the 'Alawi military elite by 
replacing its' super-power patron. The Soviet Union's withdrawal from the Middle East, 
and its eventual collapse, required the regime to seek external protection from the internal 
threat of its own military. The weak alignment to the United States and the peace process 
protects the regime. So long as the forum for negotiations continues, the arrangement 
prevents the eruption of war, which would lead to a Syrian defeat and the regime's 
replacement by the military. 
C. INTERNAL STABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Bashar al- Asad has been in power for less then a year, and has )et to truly prove 
himself in office. The direction of internal affairs is toward bolstering the ailing Syrian 
economy and issues of 'high policy' presently seem to be less important. The Syrian 
government gave a measured reaction to the recent clashes between Palestinians and the 
Israeli Defense Forces in the occupied territories, and reflected the same response as the 
other regional Arab states, harsh on rhetoric, but no concrete action. 
Asad is still enjoying the nation's sympathy over his father's death. Regardless of 
the oppressive nature of his regime, his own people and regional leaders view Asad in 
75 
positive terms. The 'honeymoon' effect will expire by the first anniversary of his father's 
passing. After that time, the people will reassess their own situation and how it as fared 
under their new leader. The key for Bashar al-Asad is to improve the lot of the Syrian 
people between now and then. Improvement can only come through economic reforms 
that reduce government interference in business affairs, and political reforms that reduce 
the regime's oppressive presence in daily life. These same reforms should also benefit 
the Sunni urban business elite, who will approve of them. 
Internal stability is the first requirement for Syria to be able to reach a peace 
agreement with Israel. The regime of Bashar al-Asad must show that it can support both 
the 'Alawi military elite and the Sunni urban business class. Bashar al-Asad must show 
that he is a worthy successor to his father, capable of fulfilling his father's legacy and 
maintaining the balance of internal forces. 
D. THE SYRIAN POSITION FOR PEACE 
A review of recent Syrian history concerning the peace process has shown a 
steadfast adherence to United Nations resolutions. Under Hafiz al-Asad, the prospect of 
peace with Israel came nearly twenty years after his assumption to power. Once in 
negotiations, the Syrian stance was extremely unbending. In simple terms, the Syrian 
requirement is the complete return of all land occupied by Israel in the 1967 Six Day 
War, and the return to the borders ante bellum. On a personal level, Hafiz al-Asad may 
have felt responsible for the loss of the Syrian Golan Heights as the Syrian Defense 
Minister in 1967, and this would explain the hard line that he took. Using the 
omnibalancing argument however, throughout the majority of the elder Asad's tenure as 
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president, the 'Alawi military elite were the main power brokers of the regime. As 
previously stated, their interests compel maintenance of the status quo. 
Bashar al-Asad does not hail from the same martial background as his father. He 
is a trained ophthalmologist thru;t into his current position following the death of his 
older brother Basil. As the leader of the Syrian regime, he may have his own opinions on 
how to conclude a peace agreement with Israel, but is constrained by the requirement of 
maintaining the support of both the 'Alawi military elite and the Sunni urban business 
class. 
Bashar al-Asad owes his position to the military elite. In Bashar al-Asad's first 
address to the National Assembly, he used his father's hard-line rhetoric concerning the 
Middle East peace process as it pertains to the Syrian case. Though lacking a military 
background, Bashar al- Asad is obviously attune to their views. Whether this is his own 
personal position is irrelevant, because a departure from the military's viewpoint could 
mean his own departure from the national scene as well. 
E. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
As the conduit of the Middle East Peace Process, the United States should 
understand the implications of the regime change in Syria. 
Hafiz al- Asad set the bar for negotiations very high. Indeed, he went to his death 
without wavering from his position of a full return of the Golan Heights to Syria. The 
disagreement is not existential; rather it is simply territorial. The Camp David Accords 
between Egypt and Israel resulted in the full withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai 
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to the international border of Egypt and Mandate Palestine. I 59 Syria wants nothing less. 
Any movement away from Hafiz al-Asad's position, would incite the 'Alawi military 
elite to remove Bashar al-Asad from power as quickly as they put him there. 
The United States must understand the new Syrian leader's precarious position 
and know that he will follow the wishes of his power elite. This precariousness is not 
favorable to what many see as a change for the better in Syria. Bashar al-Asad may very 
well embark his nation on the road to economic recovery which will improve stability in 
the region. These are issues that are peripheral to the 'Alawi military and beneficial to 
the Sunni urban business class, but they will not change the Syrian requirement for a 
peace agreement with Israel. 
A peace agreement between Syria and Israel will bring Syria into the world's 
mainstream. In effect, once the psychological hurdle of making peace has passed, the 
opportunity to grow and develop will be the regime's main concern. 
The regime seems to be taking steps toward strengthening the economic 
infrastructure of the state in order to benefit from a peace settlement. This economic 
strengthening would please its Sunni urban business class, but it is the 'Alawi elite who 
remain as the regime's final arbiters and it is the 'Alawi elite who will enforce any 
agreement's requirements. 
159 William B. Quandt, Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute Since 
1967. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 467. 
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VI. APPENDIX A 
LEBANON-SYRIA TREATY OF COOPERATION MAY 20 1991 
The Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic on the basis of the distinguished 
brotherly relations between them which serve their strength from the roots of kinship, 
history, common affiliation, common destiny, and joint strategic interests; out of their 
belief that the achievement of the broadest cooperation and coordination between them 
will serve their strategic interests and provide the means for ensuring their development 
and progress and for defending their pan-Arab and national security be a source of 
prosperity and stability enable them to face all regional and international developments 
and meet the aspirations of peoples of the two countries; and in implementation of the 
Lebanese national accord which was ratified by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on 5 
November 1989 have agreed on the following: 
Article 1. The two states will work to achieve the highest level of cooperation and 
coordination in all political economic security cultural scientific and other fields in a 
manner that will realize the interests of the two fraternal countries within the framework 
of respect for their individual sovereignty and independence and will enable the two 
countries to use their political economic and security resources to provide prosperity and 
stability ensure their pan-Arab and national security and expand and strengthen their 
common interests as an affirmation of the brotherly relations and guarantee of their 
common destiny. 
Article 2. The two states will work to achieve cooperation and coordination in the 
economic agricultural industrial and commercial fields as well as in the fields of 
transportation communications customs the establishment of joint profits and 
coordination of development plans. 
Article 3. The connection between the security of the two countries requires that 
Lebanon not become a threat to Syria's security and vice versa under any circumstances. 
Therefore Lebanon will not allow itself to become a transit point or base for any force 
state or organization that seeks to undermine its security or that of Syria. Syria which 
cherishes Lebanon's security independence and unity and the agreement among its people 
will not allow any action that threatens Lebanon's security independence and sovereignty. 
Article 4. After the political reforms are approved in a constitutional manner as 
stipulated in the Lebanese national accord and after the deadlines specified in this accord 
have expired the Syrian and Lebanese Governments will decide on the redeployment of 
the Syrian forces in the al- Biqa' area and the entrance to western al- Biqa' in Dahr as-
Bay dar up to the Haammanah-al-Mudayri-'Any Dara line and if necessary in other points 
to be specified by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. The two governments will 
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conclude an agreement specifying the size and duration of the Syrian forces' presence in 
these areas and the relationship of these forces with the authorities of the Lebanese state. 
Article 5. The two states' Arab and international foreign policy shall be based on 
the following principles: 
1. Lebanon and Syria are Arab states which are committed to the Arab 
League Charter, the Arab defense pact, and joint economic cooperation and all 
agreements ratified within the framework of the Arab League. 
They are members of the United Nations and are committed to its Charter. 
They are also members of the Non-aligned Movement. 
2. The two countries share a common destiny and common interests. 
3. Each country supports the other in issues related to its security and 
national interests in accordance of the conteits of this treaty. Therefore the 
governments of the two countries shall coordinate their Arab and international 
policies, cooperate to the fullest extent possible in Arab and international 
institutions and organizations, and coordinate their stands on regional and 
international issues. 
Article 6. The following bodies shall be formed to achieve the goals of this treaty. 
Other bodies can be established by a decision from the Supreme Council. 
1. The Supreme Council: 
A. The Supreme Council will consist of the presidents of the two 
contracting countries and a number of other members from both countries. 
B. The Supreme Council will meet at least once a year and more 
often when necessary at a venue to be agreed upon. 
C. The Supreme Council charts the general policy for coordination 
and cooperation between the two states in the political, economic, 
security, military, and other fields. It also supervises the implementation 
of this policy and adopts the plans and decisions that are made by the 
Executive Body, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Economic and Social 
Affairs Committee, the Defense and Security Affairs committee, or any 
committee that is established in the future provided that the constitutional 
provisions of the two countries are respected. 
D. The Supreme Council's decisions are binding and effective 
within the framework of the constitutional laws and rules of the two 
countries except for those decisions, which require the approval of the 
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executive or legislative authorities in the two countries under their 
constitutional provisions. 
E. The Supreme Council defines the subjects on which the 
committees concerned have the right to make decisions. Once they are 
issued these decisions assume an executive nature within the framework of 
the constitutional laws and rules of the two countries except for those 
decisions, which require the approval of the executive or legislative 
authorities in the two countries under their constitutional provisions. 
2. The Executive Body: 
The Executive Body will consist of the prime m1msters of the two 
countries and a number of ministers concerned with the relations between them. 
This body will assume the following tasks: 
A. To follow up on the implementation of the decisions and to 
submit reports to the Supreme Council on the phases of implementation. 
B. To coordinate the recommendations and decisions of the 
specialized committees and to submit the proposals to the supreme 
council. 
C. To hold meetings with the specialized committees whenever 
the need arises. 
D. The Executive Body will meet at least once every six months and more 
often when necessary at a venue to be agreed upon. 
3. The Foreign Affairs Committee: 
A. The Foreign Affairs Committee will consist of the two 
countries' foreign ministers. 
B. The Foreign Affairs Committee will meet at least once every 
two months and more often when necessary in the two countries' capitals 
on a rotating basis. 
C. The Foreign Affairs Committee will seek to coordinate the 
foreign policy of the two countries with regard 1o their relations with all 
countries. The committee will work to coordinate their activities and 
stands at Arab and international organizations. The relevant plans will be 
drawn up and submitted to the Supreme Council. 
4. The Economic and Social Affairs Committee: 
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A. The Economic and Social affairs Committee will consist of the 
ministers concerned in the two countries in economic and social sectors. 
B. The Economic and Social affairs Committee will meet in the 
two countries' capitals on a rotating basis at least once every two months 
and more often when necessary. 
C. The Economic and Social affairs Committee will be 
responsible for working to attain economic and social coordination 
between the two countries and for drawing up the recommendations that 
will lead to such coordination. 
D. The recommendations adopted by the Economic and Social 
affairs Committee will take effect after they have been endorsed by the 
Supreme Council in accordance with the constitutional provisions of the 
two countries. 
5. The Defense and Security Affairs Committee: 
A. The Defense and Security Affairs Committee will consist of the 
two countries' ministers of defense and interior. 
B. The Defense and Security Affairs Committee will be 
responsible for studying the adequate measures needed to safeguard the 
two countries' security and for suggesting joint measures to confront any 
aggression or threat endangering their national security or any unrest that 
may disturb their internal security. 
C. All plans recommendations and measures prepared by the 
Defense and Security Affairs Committee will be submitted to the Supreme 
Council for endorsement after taking into consideration the constitutional 
rules of the two countries. 
6. The General Secretariat: 
A. A General Secretariat will be created to follow up on the 
implementation of the provisions of this treaty. 
B. The General Secretariat will be headed by a secretary general 
who will be appointed by the Supreme Council. 
C. The headquarters specialization basis and budget of the General 
Secretariat will be determined by the Supreme Council. 
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Closing Provisions: 
A. Special agreements shall be concluded between the two countries in the fields 
covered by this treaty such as the economic, security, defense, and other fields in 
accordance with the constitutional rules in each of the two countries and shall 
complement this treaty. 
B. This treaty shall take effect after being ratified by the authorities of the two 
countries in accordance with their constitutional provisions. 
C. Each of the two countries will abrogate any law or regulation, which is not in 
line with this treaty. Such abrogation will be done in a way that does not violate any 
constitutional provision in either country. 160 
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